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[1] 
§1. Beginning students of Påˆini's grammar do not take long to 
become acquainted with the search for linearity that characterises the 
commentatorial literature. If they get introduced to the grammar with the 
help of the Siddhåntakaumud¥ — as most do —, they will find themselves 
confronted with this issue from the very first sËtras onward. The 
Siddhåntakaumud¥ begins with the so-called Måheßvara sËtras (or Íiva 
sËtras); each of these sËtras is a short list of sounds followed by a 
consonant. Together the Måheßvara sËtras cover most of the sounds of the 
Sanskrit language, and the final consonants play a role in the formation of 
the so-called pratyåhåras, abbreviated ways of referring to groups of 
sounds: any sound occurring in the Måheßvara sËtras combined with one 
of those final consonants designates the intervening sounds plus the initial 
sound itself. Since the first two Måheßvara sËtras read a i u ˆ, ® ¬ k, the 
pratyåhåra ik covers the sounds i, u, ®, ¬. Numerous other examples of 
pratyåhåras are possible, and many of those are actually used in Påˆini's 
grammar. 
 The pratyåhåras constitute an extremely useful device, which 
Påˆini has taken care to explicitly introduce with the help of some sËtras 
of his A∑†ådhyåy¥. In order to create a pratyåhåra such as ik it is necessary 
to know that the final consonants of each Måheßvara sËtra has a special 
status: it is not one of the sounds enumerated, but a marker. Påˆini calls 
these markers it, and does so in sËtra 1.3.3, which is the first sËtra from the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥ cited in the Siddhåntakaumud¥. This sËtra reads hal antyam 
“[In technical usage] a final consonant [is called it]”. This sËtra is required 
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to allow the introduction of the notion of pratyåhåra in the next sËtra 
introduced in the Siddhåntakaumud¥ (1.1.71): ådir antyena sahetå “An 
initial [speech sound mentioned] together with a final [speech sound] 
which is [called] it [stands for the [2] intermediate speech sounds]” (tr. 
Joshi & Roodbergen, 1991: 130).1 
 All this seems simple enough, yet the Siddhåntakaumud¥ sees a dif-
ficulty: The sËtra hal antyam, which is necessary to introduce 
pratyåhåras, makes itself use of a pratyåhåra. The expression hal 
‘consonant’ is a pratyåhåra formed with the help of the Måheßvara sËtras, 
covering the sounds contained in Måheßvara sËtras 5 (ha ya va ra †) to 
14 (ha l). This means that the sËtras hal antyam (1.3.3) and ådir 
antyena sahetå (1.1.71), along with other sËtras, cannot be linearly 
ordered: the former needs the latter, and the latter needs the former. The 
Siddhåntakaumud¥ therefore offers the following way out. The expression 
hal is not only a pratyåhåra; Måheßvara sËtra 14, by chance or by design, 
has exactly the same form. SËtra 1.3.3 hal antyam therefore allows of 
two different interpretations. The Siddhåntakaumud¥ accepts both, but first 
the one, and at some later stage the other. In the first interpretation 
halantyam is read as a compound, meaning “the final of [Måheßvara sËtra 
14] hal [is called it]”. In this way one sound has been designated it, viz. 
the final sound l of Måheßvara sËtra 14. At this point the sËtra ådir 
antyena sahetå can operate on this single and isolated it-sound to create 
the pratyåhåra hal, which now covers all consonants. Now hal antyam 
can once again come into action and be interpreted to mean that all final 
consonants in technical usage are called it. This permits a second use of 
ådir antyena sahetå so as to create the numerous other pratyåhåras that 
are possible. 
 The beginning student who has gone through all this during his 
first class of Påˆinian grammar may well wonder whether this is really the 
way Påˆini intended his grammar to be interpreted. Other, even more 
technical, issues may soon distract his mind, and he may end up thinking 
like the text he studies, i.e., linearly. 
                                                
1 Note that already a vårttika (P. 1.1.71 vt. 1 [Mahå-bh I p. 182 l. 2]: ådir 
antyena sahetety asaµpratyaya˙ saµjñino 'nirdeßåt) points out that this sËtra 
does not indicate what is designated by the pratyåhåras formed with its help. 
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The author of the Siddhåntakaumud¥ was not the first to try to linearly 
order the rules required to create pratyåhåras. A much longer discussion is 
dedicated to this issue in Patañjali’s Mahåbhå∑ya, a text to which all 
surviving Sanskrit grammatical literature is indebted. 
 Attention is drawn to the difficulty in P. 1.3.3 vt. 3; two solutions 
are then suggested in the two following vårttikas. In the first solution hal is 
to be read as a compound meaning hal ca [3] lakåraß ca; in the second one 
hal is supposed to mean hal ca hal ca, where each hal refers to somoething 
different.2 Patañjali adds two more possible solutions that are no less 
artificial. Here it is clear that already Kåtyåyana and Patañjali tried to 
impose a form of linearity on Påˆini’s grammar. What is more, in view of 
the artificiality of the solutions proposed it is clear that the imposed 
linearity was not part of the grammar as conceived of by Påˆini. 
 A similar problem comes up in connection with P. 1.1.10 nåjjha-
lau. This sËtra follows 1.1.9 tulyåsyaprayatnaµ savarˆam, which 
states that two sounds that are produced with the same articulatory effort 
in the mouth are called savarˆa ‘homogeneous’. SËtra 10 specifies that 
vowels (ac) and consonants (hal) cannot be mutually homogeneous. The 
difficulty is that ac in 1.1.10 will cover certain consonants, by P. 1.1.69 
aˆudit savarˆasya cåpratyaya˙. The vowel i, for example, will cover 
the consonant ß. SËtra 10 will then state that ß and ß are not mutually 
homogeneous, which is a problem. 
 Kåtyåyana proposes that the difficulty results from the fact that the 
sentence prescribing homogeneity has not been completed (P. 1.1.10 vt. 4: 
våkyåparisamåpter vå), and Patañjali gives what must be the completed 
sentence:3 
 
varˆånåm upadeßas tåvat / upadeßottarakåletsaµjñå / itsaµjñottara-
kåla ådir antyena sahetå iti pratyåhåra˙ / pratyåhårottarakålå sava-
                                                
2 For a clear analysis of the arguments, see Joshi & Roodbergen, 
1994: 9-10. 
3 Mahå-bh I p. 64 l. 11-14 (on P. 1.1.19 vt. 4). Almost identical Mahå-bh I p. 
178 l. 24 - p. 179 l. 1 (on P. 1.1.69 vt. 4). 
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rˆasaµjñå / savarˆasaµjñottarakålam aˆudit savarˆasya cåpratya-
ya˙ iti savarˆagrahaˆam /.  
To begin with there is the teaching of sounds. After the teaching 
[of sounds] the name it [is introduced]. After the name it the 
pratyåhåra [is introduced] with the help of [sËtra 1.1.71:] ådir 
antyena sahetå.  After the pratyåhåra the name savarˆa [is 
introduced]. After the name savarˆa [has been introduced] savarˆa 
[sounds] are included by [sËtra 1.1.69:] aˆudit savarˆasya 
cåpratyaya˙. 
 
We know already that the introduction of pratyåhåras presupposes knowl-
edge of the name it, which itself presupposes knowledge of at least some 
pratyåhåras. The present passage skips this difficulty and moves on to re-
solve another one. Once we know the use of pratyåhåras, we can unders-
tand the sËtras (1.1.9 and 10) that [4] introduce the technical name 
savarˆa, because sËtra 10 (nåjjhalau) makes use of them. Only after the 
introduction of the term savarˆa is it possible to state that certain sounds 
also cover their homogeneous (savarˆa) sounds, as happens in P. 1.1.69 
aˆudit savarˆasya cåpratyaya˙. By sticking to this order the problem 
disappears. 
 It goes without saying that this sequence gives rise to further prob-
lems. For example, can we ever apply P. 1.1.69 to 1.1.10? And can one ap-
ply it to itself? This is strictly speaking required if we want to understand 
1.1.10 (nåjjhalau) to state, not just that the sounds of the Måheßvara 
sËtras contained in the pratyåhåra ac cannot be homogeneous with 
consonants, but quite generally that no vowels can be homogeneous with 
consonants, which is clearly Påˆini's intention. Moreover, if sËtra 1.1.69 
does not apply to itself, one might conclude that long vowels as used in the 
A∑†ådhyåy¥ do not also cover other vowels that are homogeneous with 
them (i.e., short and prolated ones, nasalized ones, etc.). In that case the 
occurrence in the grammar of long vowels followed by t (e.g. ¥t, Ët), where 
t is meant to exclude homogeneous variants whose duration is different (in 
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this case, short and prolated; by P. 1.1.70 taparas tatkålasya) would be 
strange.4 
 Patañjali deals with some of these problems, not with others. But 
whatever way he proposes to solve them, it is clear that the problems are 
to at least some extent of his own making: he creates them by imposing 
linearity on a grammar which was apparently not conceived as such.5  
 
§2.  Linearity, we learn from the above, is important for Patañjali. He 
considers it equally important within grammatical derivations, which must 
follow an orderly sequence, too. There is however more. Each step in this 
orderly sequence must be determined by the elements already in place. 
That is to say, in a derivation as envisaged by Patañjali it is not necessary 
to know what came before and what will come after. The elements in 
place must suffice to determine which next step will be taken. This, at any 
rate, is the ideal picture which Patañjali has of a grammatical derivation. 
[5] 
 This picture can be applied without great difficulty to a large 
number of Påˆinian derivations. A simple example is the derivation of 
bhavati, the third person singular present tense of the root bhË ‘be, 
become’. The form bhavati is the end product of a number of steps, in 
each of which an operation takes place which is determined by the 
situation at hand: 
 
bhË-lAÈ 
bhË-tiP  3.4.78 tiptasjhisipthasthamibvasmas.. .  
bhË-ÍaP-tiP  3.1.68 kartari ßap 
bhË-a-ti  1.3.9 tasya lopa˙ 
bho-a-ti  7.3.84 sårvadhåtukårdhadhåtukayo˙ 
bhav-a-ti  6.1.78 eco 'yavåyåva˙ 
 
                                                
4 Cf. Deshpande, 1972. 
5 Joshi & Roodbergen's following remark (1991: 127) may correctly express 
Påˆini's position: “At all times the knowledge of all rules is presupposed for the 
understanding and application of all other rules.” It is however unlikely that this 
was Patañjali's, or indeed Kåtyåyana's position. 
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The substitution of av for o in the last step can only take place here, and 
not earlier, for only here the sound o has made its appearance which can 
then be replaced by av. Similarly, the elision of markers can only take 
place once they have made their appearance; one might squabble about 
whether this elision should take place immediately after the appearance of 
the marker or somewhat later, but this does not change the fact that this 
elision does not need to know what happened earlier or what is going to 
happen later. One may also wonder whether substitution of o for Ë in bhË, 
so as to arrive at bho, must take place before or after ÍaP has been 
inserted; in both cases bhË is followed by a sårvadhåtuka suffix, so that 
both situations fulfil the requirements of 7.3.84 
sårvadhåtukårdhadhåtukayo˙. Whatever the answer to this question, 
it is clear that substitution of o for Ë does not need to know anything about 
the earlier and later stages of the derivation. 
 As is well known, many of the technical discussions of Påˆinian 
grammar concern issues like the ones just mentioned. Often they are about 
situations in which two or more rules apply simultaneously. The question 
that they try to resolve is: which of the two or three rules that apply takes 
precedence? The discussions are often complex, but a number of general 
principles stand out. I present them in a form which I have copied from a 
handout accompanying a lecture by S. D. Joshi and Paul Kiparsky during a 
presentation at the Påˆini Workshop in honour of S. D. Joshi, held at 
Stanford University in March 2002: 
 
a.  Rules apply at any opportunity, unless something prevents it. If rule A 
can feed rule B (create new inputs to B), it does. 
[6] 
b.  If more than one rule is applicable to a form, A supersedes B under the 
following conditions, in order of increasing strength: 
 (1) if A follows B in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ (A is para), 
 (2) if A bleeds (eliminates inputs to) B, but not vice versa (A is ni-
tya), 
 (3) if A is conditioned internally to B (A is antara∫ga), 
 (4) if the inputs to which A is applicable are a proper subset of the 
inputs to which B is applicable (A is apavåda). 
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This brief characterisation — point b of which can be considered a 
translation of Paribhå∑å 38 in Någeßa's Paribhå∑endußekhara: 
pËrvaparanityåntara∫gåpavådånåm uttarottaraµ bal¥ya˙ — 
clearly shows that, according to the traditional view, decisions concerning 
the continuation of a grammatical derivation at any particular point are 
taken on the basis of the situation at hand. More specifically, no 
information about the earlier or later phases of the derivation is required to 
make a correct decision at any stage. 
 In reality this linear approach, as in the case of pratyåhåras, is often 
confronted with difficulties. Sometimes an awareness of what precedes in 
a derivation seems to be necessary. There are also derivations where 
knowledge of what will come later appears to be essential. We will 
consider a number of cases of both kinds, and study how Patañjali deals 
with them. We begin with some derivations of the first kind. 
 
§3.  George Cardona observed in 1970 (p. 53) that it is clear from a rule 
such as 3.4.86 (er u˙ [lo†a˙ 85]) — which substutes tu for ti which is 
itself a substitute of lo†, as in paca-tu derived from paca-ti — that Påˆini 
considered the derivation history of elements pertinent to operations 
affecting them. This may be true, but there are reasons to think that 
Patañjali did not like looking back in the course of a derivation. 
 
§3.1 Consider the derivation of avadåta, past passive participle of the 
root daiP, with marker P. The derivation can take the following form: 
 
(1) ava-daiP-Kta 
(2) ava-dai-ta  1.3.9 tasya lopa˙ 
(3) ava-då-ta  6.1.45 åd eca upadeße 'ß iti  
[7] 
avadåta 
 
This derivation presents Patañjali with a problem. The verbal root daiP, 
once it takes the form då in situation (3) by P. 6.1.45, should be called ghu 
by 1.1.20 dådhå ghv adåp. This in its turn would have the undesired 
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consequence that dad must be substituted for då by 7.4.46 do dad gho˙, 
so that the correct form avadåta would not be obtained. The common sense 
solution to this problem lies in the circumstance that the root daiP, and 
therefore då in situation (3) of the derivation, cannot be called ghu, since 
the expression adåp in sËtra 1.1.20 dådhå ghv adåp prevents this. For 
Patañjali the situation is less simple. Since for him the elision of the 
marker P has already taken place in situation (2), nothing in situation (3) 
prevents the application of P. 1.1.20 dådhå ghv adåp. The form då 
which appears in situation (3) is not therefore dåP, and nothing prevents it 
from being considered ghu.  
 At this point Patañjali proposes that wherever elements with mark-
ers are involved, the notion of what came before must be taken into ac-
count (etac cåtra yuktaµ yat sarve∑v eva sånubandhakagrahaˆe∑u 
bhËtapËrvagatir vijñåyate / ).6 As a result the marker P will not be 
forgotten in situation (3), and the form då which occurs there will be 
known to have that marker, and therefore to be really dåP. The exception 
adåp in sËtra 1.1.20 dådhå ghv adåp will as a result prevent the form då 
in situation (3) from being considered ghu.  
 Patañjali's proposal starts from the assumption that elision of the 
marker P (by 1.3.9 tasya lopa˙) precedes the substitution of å for ai (by 
6.1.45 åd eca upadeße 'ß iti). To justify this particular order Patañjali 
adds the phrase: anaimittiko hy anubandhalopas tåvaty eva bhavati. This 
means no doubt: “For the elision of markers, being without cause, takes 
place first of all.”7  
 All this agrees with, or comes close to, the common sense 
understanding of the derivation of avadåta. However, it has obliged 
Patañjali to postulate that knowledge of preceding stages in the derivation 
is needed in order to proceed correctly at a subsequent stage. And this is 
not to his liking. He therefore makes a different suggestion. He proposes 
acceptance of a special rule — which he claims Påˆini “makes known” 
(jñåpayati) elsewhere in his A∑†ådhyåy¥ — that has the form 
nånubandhak®tam anejantatvam. This rule lives on as Paribhå∑å 7 of 
                                                
6 Mahå-bh I p. 76 l. 10-11 (on P. 1.1.20 vt. 9). 
7 Cp. the French translation of Pierre Filliozat (1976: 89): “Car l'amuïssement, 
sans cause d'application, des indices se réalise en tout premier lieu.” 
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Någeßa's [8] Paribhå∑endußekhara, and has been translated by Kielhorn 
(1874: 36) in the following way: “[A root which, when destitute of 
anubandhas, ends in either e or o or ai, must] not [be considered] to have 
ceased to end in either e or o or ai, when an anubandha has been attached 
to it.” Patañjali's proposal only makes sense on the assumption that the 
derivation of avadåta will follow a different order this time, viz.: 
 
(1) ava-daiP-Kta 
(2) ava-dåP-ta   6.1.45 åd eca upadeße 'ß iti  
(3) ava-då-ta   1.3.9 tasya lopa˙ 
avadåta 
 
Elision of the marker P follows this time the substitution of å for ai. 
 Patañjali does not explain how attribution of the technical 
designation ghu to då is prevented at stage (3). Whatever may have been 
his answer to this question (which is not recorded in the Mahåbhå∑ya), it is 
clear that his second proposal is meant to circumvent the requirement of 
needing to know what happened earlier in the derivation. 
It seems however that even this second proposal does not fully 
satisfy Patañjali, for he comes up with a third one: avadåta is not derived 
from the root daiP, but from dåP. We are not going to try to follow 
Patañjali in all this. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that Patañjali 
was obviously not happy with the idea that an awareness of earlier stages 
of a derivation might be required to bring it to a good end. 
 
§3.2 The elision of markers gives rise to difficulties elsewhere, too. 
Patañjali deals with those which occur in the derivation of gomån. The 
relevant part of the derivation of this form is: 
 
go-matUP-sU 
go-mat-s   1.3.9 tasya lopa˙ (3x) 
go-måt-s   6.4.14 atvasantasya cådhåto˙ 
go-må-nUÈ-t-s  7.1.70 ugidacåµ … 
go-må-n   8.2.23 saµyogåntasya lopa˙ (2x) 
 
FROM PÓÔINI TO PATAÑJALI 10 
 
 
Patañjali discusses this derivation under sËtra 6.4.14 atvasantasya 
cådhåto˙. The first part of this sËtra, atu, covers suffixes like flavatU and 
KtavatU, but should also include matUP. This last suffix, however, 
contains atUP, not just atU. A vårttika therefore [9] proposes that a special 
mention must be made of suffixes that have P as marker. 
 Patañjali disagrees and points out that once the marker P is elided 
by 1.3.9 tasya lopa˙, what is left is atU, which is precisely the form 
mentioned in the sËtra. At that point the suffix is no longer atupanta, but 
has become atvanta. This proposed solution gives, of course, rise to the 
objection that in a similar manner the suffix will no longer be atvanta once 
the marker U is elided. Patañjali responds feebly that by taking into 
consideration the notion of what was there before (viz. atU), this last 
problem is solved, but this only leads to the reproach that this same 
procedure takes us back to atUP. (tat tarhy upasaµkhyånaµ kartavyam / 
na kartavyam / pakåralope k®te nåtubantaµ bhavaty atvantam eva / 
yathaiva tarhi pakåralope k®te nåtubantam evam ukåralope 'pi k®te 
nåtvantam / nanu ca bhËtapËrvagatyå bhavi∑yaty atvantam / yathaiva tarhi 
bhËtapËrvagatyåtvantam evam atubantan api / evaµ tarhy åßr¥yamåˆe 
bhËtapËrvagatir atvantaµ cåßr¥yate nåtubantam // na sidhyati /).8 
 It is not necessary here to study the way in which Patañjali tries to 
solve the problem. It is clear that here, at any rate, he plays with 
bhËtapËrvagati, the notion of what was there before, but does not in the 
end accept it. 
 
§3.3 This resistance on the part of Patañjali is confirmed by other pas-
sages in the Mahåbhå∑ya. The idea that the notion of what came before has 
to be taken into account pops up in Patañjali's comments on P. 1.1.56 vt. 
21. Here the derivation of the form åttha is discussed. The relevant part of 
this derivation is as follows (cp. Joshi & Roodbergen, 1990: transl. p. 
105): 
 
... 
brË-si 
                                                
8 Mahå-bh III p. 183 l. 25 - p. 184 l. 4 (on P. 6.4.14 vt. 1). 
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åh-tha  3.4.84 bruva˙ pañcånåm ådita åho bruva˙ 
åth-tha  8.2.35 åhas tha˙ 
åt-tha  8.4.55 khari ca 
åttha 
 
The difficulty which presents itself in this derivation is that P. 7.3.93 
bruva ¥†  prescribes the augment ¥È after brË and before a sårvadhåtuka 
ending beginning with a consonant. Since åh is substituted for brË, it must 
be treated like brË by P. 1.1.56 sthånivad ådeßo 'nalvidhau. The 
ending tha, moreover, clearly [10] begins with a consonant, so that the 
incorrect form *åh¥tha seems hard to avoid. However, if one were to 
proceed like this, sËtra 8.2.35 åhas tha˙ would no longer have any use. 
The fact that this sËtra nevertheless has its place in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ obliges 
us to draw some conclusion. But which one exactly? 
 Here Patañjali (on P. 1.1.56 vt. 21) puts the following thought in 
the mouth of an opponent. This rule 8.2.35 åhas tha˙ has been 
formulated in order to let us know that the notion of what came before 
must be taken into account (Mahå-bh I p. 139 l. 14: asti hy anyad etasya 
vacane prayojanam / kim / bhËtapËrvagatir yathå vijñåyeta /). P. 8.2.35 
prescribes substitution of final h of åh by th, if an ending beginning with a 
consonant included in the pratyåhåra jhal follows. After adding the 
augment ¥È, the ending will be ¥tha and will no longer begin with such a 
consonant. But at an earlier stage of the derivation the ending was still tha, 
and did begin with a consonant included in the pratyåhåra jhal. According 
to the opponent, therefore, P. 8.2.35 can be applied, presumably leading to 
some such incorrect form as *åth¥tha. 
 Patañjali disagrees, of course. As a matter of fact, he uses the 
occasion to criticise the principle that the notion of what came before must 
be taken into account. If that principle were valid, not only the ending tha, 
but all endings before which åh is substituted for brË will have to be 
considered as beginning with a consonant included in the pratyåhåra jhal, 
for these five endings are substituted for tiP, tas, jhi, siP and thas 
respectively, each of which begins with such a consonant. That being the 
case, Påˆini might as well immediately have substituted åth for brË in 
sËtra 3.4.84, which would then read: *bruva˙ pañcånåm ådita åtho 
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bruva˙. The fact that Påˆini has not formulated the sËtra in this manner 
shows that the opponent was wrong to begin with, and that the difficulty 
has to be resolved differently. It also shows that Patañjali, in this case too, 
has no sympathy for the idea that earlier stages of a derivation should be 
taken into consideration in subsequent ones. (Mahå-bh I p. 139 l. 15-16: 
yady evaµ thavacanam anarthakaµ syåt / åthim evåyam uccårayet / 
bruva˙ pañcånåm ådita åtho bruva iti /.) 
 
§3.4 The Mahåbhå∑ya evokes the same principle in the context of P. 
6.1.177 nåm anyatarasyåm, which optionally prescribes the udåtta 
accent for the genitive plural ending nåm in certain circumstances. This 
accent should, for example, be given to the final syllable nåm of agn¥nåm, 
the genitive plural of agni. The relevant steps of the derivation are: 
[11] 
agni-åm 
agni-nUÈ-åm  7.1.54 hrasvanadyåpo nu† 
agn¥-nåm  6.4.3 nåmi 
agn¥-n≤m  6.1.177 nåm anyatarasyåm 
 
The difficulty in this derivation is that in 6.1.177 nåm anyatarasyåm 
there is anuv®tti of hrasvåt (from 6.1.176 hrasvanu∂bhyåµ matup). 
The ending nåm in agn¥nåm does not however follow a short vowel. And a 
discussion brings to light that sËtra 6.1.177 cannot be applied to any 
example where nåm does follow a short vowel. Patañjali therefore 
proposes that the notion of what was there before must be taken into 
account. The final i of agni was short, and this earlier circumstance has to 
be taken into account, so that sËtra 6.1.177 can be applied to agn¥nåm. 
(Mahå-bh III p. 109 l. 8-9: åhåyaµ hrasvåntåd iti na ca nåmi hrasvånto ‘sti 
tatra bhËtapËrvagatir vijñåsyate / hrasvåntaµ yad bhËtapËrvam iti /.) 
 Patañjali’s subsequent discussion shows that, once again, he was 
not happy with the idea of taking into account earlier stages of the 
derivation. He settles for an interpretation of sËtra 6.1.177 in which the 
udåtta accent is optionally prescribed for nåm when it follows a word 
whose final vowel is short before the altogether different suffix matUP. 
Patañjali’s interpretation raises serious questions as to his use of anuv®tti 
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— the nominative matup of the preceding sËtra appears here as the 
locative matau —, but it is clear that he prefers this forced interpretation of 
6.1.177 to making use of knowledge of earlier stages in the same 
derivation. (Mahå-bh III p. 109 l. 20-21: athavå naivaµ vijñåyate 
nåmsvare matau hrasvagrahaˆaµ kartavyam iti / kathaµ tarhi / nåmsvare 
matau hrasvåd iti vartata iti //.) 
 The same derivation is at the centre of another discussion in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, this one under P. 6.4.3 nåmi. The question here is why this 
sËtra is formulated nåmi rather than *åmi. It turns out that in the latter 
case, at the stage agni-åm, lengthening of i (by the modified sËtra 6.4.3 
*åmi) would have precedence over adding nUÈ (by 7.1.54 
hrasvanadyåpo nu†), because the former rule would be nitya. The 
discussion further shows that there would in that case be no use for sËtra 
7.1.54. At his point Patañjali suggests that the notion of what was there 
before might have to be taken into account: nUÈ can then be added to 
agn¥-åm because the i of agni was short at an earlier stage. 
 This time Patañjali does not explicitly reject this line of reasoning. 
That does not mean that he pronounces the rule 6.4.3 nåmi badly formu-
lated. No, he passes on to another justification of [12] the formulation 
given by Påˆini: this particular formulation has been chosen in view of the 
later rule nopadhåyå˙. It is hard to conclude with certainty whether or 
not Patañjali here accepted the reasoning based on the notion of what was 
there before as valid. 
 
§3.5 Patañjali has occasion to invoke the principle under sËtra 6.3.66 
khity anavyayasya. This sËtra prescribes shortening of the final vowel 
of a stem when followed by an uttarapada whose suffix has the marker 
KH. This accounts for forms like kåliµmanyå “a woman who considers 
herself Kål¥”. The relevant part of the derivation is as follows: 
 
kål¥-man-KHaÍ  3.2.83 åtmamåne khaß ca 
kål¥-man-ÍyaN-KHaÍ 3.1.69 divådibhya˙ ßyan 
kål¥-mUM-man-ya-KHaÍ 6.3.67 arurdvi∑adajantasya mum 
kålim-man-ya-KHaÍ  6.3.66 khity anavyayasya 
kåliµmanyå   other rules 
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Patañjali does not tell us why he introduces mUM before considering 
shortening of ¥ in kål¥, but we may assume that the fact that P. 6.3.67 
comes after P. 6.3.66 and is therefore para with regard to the latter made 
him decide so.9 The difficulty with this derivation is that ¥ is no longer the 
final vowel of kål¥ once the augment mUM has been added to it. Patañjali, 
after having explored some other possibilities first, proposes that the 
notion of what was there before should be taken into account. (Mahå-bh 
III p. 165 l. 22-23: athavå khiti hrasvo bhavat¥ty ucyate / khity anantaro 
hrasvabhåv¥ nåst¥ti k®två bhËtapËrvagatir vijñåsyate / ajantaµ yad 
bhËtapËrvam iti //.)  
 I am not sure whether I have fully understood Patañjali's remaining 
discussion on this sËtra. He concludes it with the statement: tasmåt 
pËrvoktåv eva parihårau, which I find particularly puzzling. This means 
something like “Therefore the two refutations mentioned earlier [must be 
accepted]”. I have not been able to identify the two refutations mentioned 
earlier. However that may be, it seems clear that Patañjali's proposal to 
take into account the notion of what was there before is part of a line of 
argument which he subsequently abandons. 
 
§3.6 SËtra 7.2.37 graho 'l i † i  d¥rgha˙ is meant to account for forms 
like grah¥tå, with long ¥. This is only possible, it is objected, if there is anu-
v®tti in this sËtra of i†a˙, the genitive singular of iÈ. [13] This however is 
problematic, because the only iÈ used in the preceding sËtras is a 
nominative singular i† in P. 7.2.35 årdhadhåtukasye∂  valåde˙. The 
question therefore presents itself whether anuv®tti of the two genitives 
årdhadhåtukasya and valåde˙ might suffice to arrive at the correct form. 
The derivation of grah¥tå passes through the following stages: 
 
(1) grah-tå 
(2) grah-iÈ-tå  7.2.35 årdhadhåtukasye∂  valåde˙ 
(3) grah-¥-tå  7.2.37 graho 'l i † i  d¥rgha˙ 
 
                                                
9 This also appears to be Någeßa's position. 
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At stage (2) the root grah is indeed followed by an årdhadhåtuka suffix, 
but this suffix does not begin with a sound included in the pratyåhåra val, 
because it now begins with short i. However, at the preceding stage (1) the 
suffix began with t, which is included in val. Patañjali therefore suggests 
that the problem is solved by taking into account the notion of what was 
there before. (Mahå-bh III p. 294 l. 14-16 (on P. 7.2.37 vt. 6): årdhadhå-
tukasyeti vartate / graha˙ parasyårdhadhåtukasya d¥rghatvaµ vak∑yåmi / 
ihåpi tarhi pråpnoti / grahaˆam grahaˆ¥yam / valåder iti vartate / evam api 
grah¥tå grah¥tum atra na pråpnoti / bhËtapËrvagatyå bhavi∑yati //) 
 In what follows it is clear that Patañjali is not happy with this 
solution. In the end he accepts that i†a˙ has to be understood in P. 7.2.37, 
to be explained by anuv®tti with changed case-ending of i† from P. 7.2.35. 
 
§3.7 An equally hypothetical context is provided by the discussion of 
daridrå under sËtra 7.2.67 vasv ekåjådghasåm. This sËtra prescribes the 
augment iÈ before vasU after, among other things, a root having but one 
vowel. The formulation of this sËtra gives rise to doubts, for clearly the 
expression ekåc is meant to concern roots that have but one vowel after 
reduplication. It concerns forms like pecivån, not bibhidvån. Yet this 
special condition is not stated. 
 At some point in the discussion Patañjali proposes that the mention 
of åt in the sËtra shows that reduplicated roots are concerned, for there are 
no non-reduplicated roots in å that have more than one vowel. This, an op-
ponent points out, is not true. The root daridrå ends in å and has more than 
one vowel. It is true that this å is elided in the situation where P. 7.2.67 
might apply. This elision, as P. 6.4.114 vt. 2 specifies, is siddha with 
regard to the prescription of suffixes. Patañjali on P. 7.2.67 adds that this 
elision is also siddha with regard to the prescription of the augment iÈ. All 
this means that daridrå cannot count in this context as a case of a [14] root 
in å that has more than one vowel. The opponent is not disheartened. He 
insists that, also in this specific context, it is a root in å having more than 
one vowel if one takes into account the notion of what was there before. 
(Mahå-bh III p. 300 l. 21-25 (on P. 7.2.67 vt. 1): yat tarhy åkåragrahaˆaµ 
karoti na hi kaßcid ak®te dvirvacana åkårånto 'nekåj asti / nanu cåyam asti 
daridråti˙ / na daridråter i†å bhavitavyam / kiµ kåraˆam / uktam etad 
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daridråter årdhadhåtuke lopa˙ siddhaß ca pratyayavidhåv iti / yaß cedån¥µ 
pratyayavidhau siddha˙ siddho 'såv i∂vidhau / evam api bhËtapËrvagatir 
vijñåyate / åkårånto yo bhËtapËrva iti /) 
 It is not clear to what extent Patañjali took this argument seriously. 
He abandons the discussion of daridrå in order to concentrate on another 
indication which presumably shows that reduplicated roots with one vowel 
are intended in P. 7.2.67. 
 
§3.8 One more hypothetical context is evoked in the Mahåbhå∑ya on P. 
7.3.83 jusi ca. This sËtra is meant to account for the substitution of guˆa 
for u in the derivation of ajuhavu˙. The relevant part of this derivation is 
as follows: 
 
hu-lA‹ 
hu-jha   3.4.78 tiptasjhi. . .  
hu-ÍaP-jha  3.1.68 kartari ßap 
hu-Ílu-jha  2.4.75 juhotyådibhya˙ ßlu˙ 
hu-hu-Ílu-jha  6.1.10 ßlau 
hu-hu-jha  1.1.61 pratyayasya lukßlulupa˙ 
hu-hu-Jus  3.4.109 sijabhyastavidibhyaß ca 
aÈ-hu-hu-Jus  6.4.71 lu∫la∫l®∫k∑v a∂  udåtta˙ 
a-hu-ho-Jus  7.3.83 jusi ca 
a-hu-hav-us  6.1.78 eco 'yavåyåva˙ 
a-ju-hav-us  8.4.54 abhyåse car ca 
etc. 
 
For reasons that do not concern us at present, Patañjali proposes to read P. 
7.3.83 as *ajusi ca and to understand in it ßiti from 7.3.75 
∑ †hivuklamucamåµ ßiti .  The problem in this case is that P. 7.3.83 
would not then be applicable to forms like ajuhavu˙, because hu is not fol-
lowed by something that has the marker Í at the stage where it is to be re-
placed by ho. But at an earlier stage of the derivation hu was followed by 
Ílu, which did have that marker. Patañjali therefore proposes to take into 
account the notion of what was there before. This then turns out to be in 
need of some further specification. In the end Patañjali abandons the idea 
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of reading sËtra 7.3.83 in this strange manner, and with it his proposal to 
take [15] into account the notion of what was there before. (Mahå-bh III p. 
335 l. 12-14 (on P. 7.3.83 vt. 1): evaµ tarhi ßit¥ti vartate / evam api 
ajuhavu˙ abibhayur ity atra na pråpnoti / bhËtapËrvagatyå bhavi∑yati / na 
sidhyati na hy us ßidbhËtapËrva˙ / us ßidbhËtapËrvo nåst¥ti k®tvosi ya˙ 
ßidbhËtapËrvas tasmin bhavi∑yati // athavå kriyate nyåsa eva / ...) 
 
§3.9 One passage remains which, though not actually using the 
expression bhËtapËrvagati like the preceding ones, appears to refer to the 
same idea. This passage presents itself in the form of a ßlokavårttika under 
P. 7.1.9 ato bhisa ais, which prescribes the substitution of ais for bhis in 
the derivation of forms such as v®k∑ais, the instrumental plural of v®k∑a 
‘tree’. The ßlokavårttika concerned reads: ettvaµ bhisi paratvåc ced ata ais 
kva bhavi∑yati / k®ta ettve bhautapËrvyåd ais tu nityas tathå sati //. Joshi & 
Roodbergen (2003: 29) translate this as follows: “If the substitution of e 
(for a stem-final a is applied) before bhis (by P. 7.3.103 [bahuvacane 
jhaly et]) because it is the later rule (in relation to P. 7.1.9), then (the 
question is) where will ais (by P. 7.1.9) have scope? Even if the 
substitution of e has been applied (first, still) ais (can be applied) on 
account of its coming earlier (than e). This being so, (P. 7.1.9 becomes) 
nitya ‘invariably applicable’.” 
 Joshi & Roodbergen then explain this passage in the following 
words (p. 29-30): 
 
[A]t the stage v®k∑a + bhis two rules become applicable simultane-
ously, namely, P. 7.1.9 (ais in place of bhis) and P. 7.3.103 (e in 
place of the stem final a). This is a two-way conflict in the sense 
that whichever rule we apply first, the other rule will be debarred. 
The point is that P. 7.3.103 is conditioned by a suffix beginning 
with a jhaL sound (any consonant except a nasal). Once bhis has 
been replaced by ais, there is no jhaL sound any more. Now, to 
solve this conflict, suppose we invoke P. 1.4.2 [viprati∑edhe 
paraµ kåryam], as is done by tradition. Accordingly, P. 7.3.103 
will prevail over P. 7.1.9. The form derived will be v®k∑ebhi˙, ins-
tead of v®k∑ai˙. The consequence is that now the substitution of ais 
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is left without scope of application. In other words, P. 7.1.9 will be 
anavakåßa. Being anavakåßa, it must prevail. That seems to clinch 
the matter. 
 In the second line, first påda, of the Ílokavårttika another 
solution is offered. The argument turns on what is called bhËtapËr-
vagati ‘the understanding of something that [16] was there in an 
earlier stage. ... The something meant here is the stem final a, like 
in v®k∑a + bhis. We will now assume that even after the application 
of P. 7.3.103 (v®k∑e + bhis) that stem-final a is still there. 
Therefore P. 7.1.9 can be applied. But, as stated in the second line, 
second påda, this amounts to assuming that P. 7.1.9 has the 
character of a nitya rule which is to be applied irrespective of any 
other rule. 
 
Once again, the use of pËrvabhËtagati is here completely hypothetical. The 
main interest of this passage lies in the circumstance that the device of loo-
king backward is here not proposed by Patañjali, but by the author of a 
ßlokavårttika. Since nothing is known about the authorship of the 
ßlokavårttikas contained in the Mahåbhå∑ya, it is not easy to evaluate the 
significance of this fact. 
 
§3.10 The above analysis of all the passages of the Mahåbhå∑ya that use 
the expression bhËtapËrvagati “notion of what was there before” allows us 
to conclude with great likelihood that Patañjali never accepts as his own 
the point of view which permits the use of knowledge of what happened at 
earlier stages of a derivation. The temptation to do so is yet great, as these 
discussions show. They also show that Patañjali was aware that such 
knowledge might be useful to assure the correct development of a 
derivation. Yet he is against it. On one occasion, as we have seen (see 
§3.3), he goes to the extent of explicitly criticising this point of view. 
 
 
§4.  To the extent possible, a derivation should only make use of the 
information that is available at any particular stage. Knowledge of what 
was there before is, where possible, avoided. The same is true for 
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knowledge about following stages. One does not, in principle, need to 
know what form is being derived, nor indeed what future stages will have 
to be passed through, in order to carry out a correct derivation. The rules 
and meta-rules of grammar will all by themselves lead the derivation to 
the correct result. 
 This is Patañjali's ideal. This ideal is all the more interesting in that 
Joshi & Kiparsky have recently argued that “lookahead” — i.e., 
knowledge of future stages of a derivation — is required to obtain correct 
results. This is not the place to examine Joshi & Kiparsky's position. I will 
rather concentrate on some [17] passages where Patañjali's attempt not to 
use lookahead is confronted with serious difficulties. 
 
§4.1 Joshi & Kiparsky draw attention to the fact that the tradition did 
not manage to avoid lookahead altogether. They specifically cite in this 
connection Paribhå∑å 64 from Någeßa’s Paribhå∑endußekhara, which 
reads: upasaµjani∑yamåˆanimitto ‘py apavåda 
upasaµjåtanimittam apy utsargaµ bådhate “An apavåda 
supersedes, even though the causes of its (application) are still to present 
themselves, a general rule the causes of which are already present” (tr. 
Kielhorn). This Paribhå∑å is mentioned by Någeßa in the context of the 
discussion of the derivation of dadhati “they put”. Joshi & Kiparsky 
contrast the in their view correct derivation of this word with a wrong one: 
 
Correct derivation Wrong derivation 
 
dhå-jhi  dhå-jhi  
dhå-ÍaP-jhi 3.1.68 kar tar i ßap dhå-ÍaP-jhi 3.1.68 kar tar i ßap 
dhå-(ßlu)-jhi 2.4.75 juhotyåd ibhya˙ ßlu˙ dhå-ÍaP-anti 7.1.3 jho ‘nta˙ 
da-dhå-jhi 6.1.10 ßlau, etc. dhå-(ßlu)-anti 2.4.75 juhotyåd ibhya˙ ßlu˙ 
da-dhå-ati 7.1.4 ad abhyaståt da-dhå-anti 6.1.10 ßlau, etc. 
dadhati (other rules) *dadhanti (other rules) 
 
They conclude: “Application of 7.1.3-4 must be deferred until 
reduplication has taken effect. This crucially requires lookahead.” 
 Paribhå∑å 64 agrees, and with it at least part of the traditional 
commentators. This does not however include the Mahåbhå∑ya. Paribhå∑å 
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64 does not occur in this text. Någeßa attributes it to the “modern” 
(nav¥na) grammarians, which means, according to his commentator 
Påyaguˆ∂a, to [Bha††oji] D¥k∑ita etc. The question that interests us at 
present is: How did the Mahåbhå∑ya deal with the difficulties connected 
with the derivation of dadhati? 
 The Mahåbhå∑ya does not discuss this derivation. In order to find 
out what Patañjali thinks about the kind of difficulties that arise in the 
derivation of dadhati, we must stay a little longer with Någeßa to study 
what more he has to say about it.10 In dealing with the difficulties, Någeßa 
first introduces two other Paribhå∑ås. These read: 
 
Pbh. 62: pËrvaµ hy apavådå abhinivißante paßcåd utsargå˙ 
Pbh. 63: prakalpya våpavådavi∑ayaµ tata utsargo ‘bhinivißate 
[18] 
Kielhorn offers the following translation, which is however influenced by 
Någeßa's specific interpretation: 
 
 “Apavådas, it is certain, are considered first (in order to find out 
where they apply); afterwards the general rules (are made to take 
effect in all cases to which it has thus been ascertained that the 
Apavådas do not apply.)” 
“Or (we may say that) first all (forms) which fall under the Apavåda 
are set aside, and that subsequently the general rule is employed (in 
the formation of the remaining forms).” 
 
The newly created Paribhå∑å 64 is supposedly based upon these two Pari-
bhå∑ås. 
 The statements known as Paribhå∑ås 62 and 63 in the 
Paribhå∑endußekhara occur a number of times in Patañjali's Mahåbhå∑ya, 
not however as Paribhå∑ås but as ordinary sentences. They invariably 
                                                
10 Cp. Bronkhorst, 1986: 133-35. 
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occur together, and appear to be connected by the word ca rather than vå.11 
The resulting combined sentence is: 
 
pËrvaµ hy apavådå abhinivißante paßcåd utsargå˙ / prakalpya 
cåpavådavi∑ayaµ tata utsargo 'bhinivißate / 
 
Joshi & Roodbergen (1981: 43) translate this as follows: 
 
“because special rules become effective first (and) general rules 
(only) afterwards, and after we have formed an idea of the domain of 
the special rule the general rule becomes effective”. 
 
Most contexts in which these sentences occur are of no particular interest 
for us at present, but the following passage is. 
 Under P. 4.1.89 vt. 2 (Mahå-bh II p. 240 l. 24-25) we find, 
exceptionally, the sentences pËrvaµ hy apavådå abhinivißante paßcåd 
utsargå˙ and prakalpya cåpavådavi∑ayaµ tata utsargo 'bhinivißate 
separated from each other. The case discussed here is not altogether 
dissimilar to that of dadhati studied above, as will become clear below. It 
concerns the derivation of forms like gårg¥yå˙ ‘students of the descendants 
of Garga’ 
 The general rule here is P. 2.4.64 yañañoß ca, which prescribes 
luk-elision in the plural of the suffix yaÑ used in the formation of gårgya 
‘descendent of Garga’. The plural of gårgya is therefore gargå˙ 
‘descendents of Garga’. A difficulty arises in the formation of gårg¥ya 
‘student of a descendent of Garga’, with the suffix CHa (= ¥ya, by P. 7.1.2) 
prescribed by P. 4.2.114 v®ddhåc cha˙. As long as one sticks to the 
singular there is no problem. However, in the formation of gårg¥yå˙ 
‘students of descendants of Garga’, P. 2.4.64 threatens to take away the 
suffix [19] yaÑ by luk-elision, leaving garga instead of gårgya. Garga, 
unlike gårgya, is not called v®ddha (see P. 1.1.73 v®ddhir yasyåcåm 
ådis tad v®ddham), and cannot therefore take the suffix CHa. The 
                                                
11 See Joshi and Roodbergen, 1981: 43, fn. 156. Ashok Aklujkar has given a 
lecture about these two Paribhå∑ås at the annual meeting of the American 
Oriental Society in 2003 (Nashville); he appears to prefer the reading vå. 
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situation is supposedly saved by P. 4.1.89 gotre ' lug aci, which 
prohibits luk-elision before certain suffixes beginning with a vowel, and 
which is therefore an exception to P. 2.4.64. This gives rise to the 
following scheme: 
 
Correct derivation Wrong derivation 
gårgya  gårgya 
gårgya-cha 4.2.114 v®ddhåc cha˙ gårgya-luk   2.4.64 yañañoß ca 
gårgya-¥ya 7.1.2 åyaney ¥n¥yiya˙ pha∂hakhachaghåµ  garga 
gårgya-(aluk)-¥ya 4.1.89 gotre ' lug  aci The suffix CHa cannot be added  
gårgy-¥ya 6.4.148 yasyet i ca at this point 
gårg¥ya 6.4.151 åpatyasya ca taddhi te 'nåti  
 
If one accepts lookahead, application of 2.4.64 (with its exception 4.1.89) 
must be deferred until CHa (= ¥ya) has been added. This is not however 
the way in which the Bhå∑yakåra explains the situation. Patañjali offers in 
fact three ways to deal with this derivation: 
(i) By teaching aluk before a taddhita suffix beginning with a vowel, 
Påˆini indicates that luk and aluk must apply simultaneously. (Mahå-bh II 
p. 240 l. 21-22 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): yad ayaµ bhËmni pråptasya luko 'jådau 
taddhite 'lukaµ ßåsti taj jñåpayaty åcårya˙ samånakålåv etåv aluglukåv 
iti.) 
(ii) Aluk takes effect at the point of the derivation where luk applies; in 
this way the suffix CHa connected with aluk is known. (Mahå-bh II p. 240 
l. 24-25 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): yadi vå luka˙ prasa∫ge 'lug bhavati tathåsya 
ccha˙ prasiddho bhavati.) Here Patañjali adds: pËrvaµ hy apavådå abhini-
vißante paßcåd utsargå˙. 
(iii) Luk waits for aluk to apply; in this way aluk before CHa is 
established. (Mahå-bh II p. 241 l. 2-3 (on P. 4.1.89 vt. 2): lug vå punar 
aluka˙ prasa∫gaµ yadi prat¥k∑ate tathåsya cche 'luk siddho bhavati.) 
Patañjali adds: prakalpya cåpavådavi∑ayaµ tata utsargo. 
 If we inspect Patañjali's words carefully and avoid reading these 
words in the light of their interpretation by later commentators, we do not 
find in them anything resembling lookahead. It is not suggested that we 
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need to know what will happen later in the derivation, merely that we do 
not use a rule until the circumstances have arrived that also give scope to 
its exception. In other words, Patañjali appears to treat this case on a 
purely step-by-step basis, without lookahead. And yet, a case very similar 
to this one — the derivation of dadhati — is cited both by [20] Joshi & 
Kiparsky and by Någeßa and other late grammarians in support of 
lookahead. 
 
§4.2 Joshi & Kiparsky illustrate the need for lookahead with the help of 
two examples. The first one is the derivation of sedu∑a˙, the genitive 
singular of the perfect participle of sad ‘sit’ (nom. sg. sedivån). Since this 
derivation is not discussed in the Mahåbhå∑ya, we turn immediately to the 
second example, the derivation of aupyata “it was sowed”. The correct 
derivation of this form is: 
 
vap-la‹ 
vap-ta  (at this point one must choose 3.1.67) 
vap-yaK-ta 3.1.67 sårvadhåtuke yak 
up-ya-ta 6.1.15 vacisvapiyajåd¥nåµ kiti  
å-up-ya-ta 6.4.72 å∂  ajåd¥nåm 
aupyata (other rules) 
 
The following derivation is incorrect: 
 
vap-la‹ 
vap-ta  (if we choose 6.4.71, the wrong form is derived) 
a-vap-ta 6.4.71 lu∫la∫l®∫k∑v a∂  udåtta˙ 
a-vap-yaK-ta 3.1.67 sårvadhåtuke yak 
a-up-ya-ta 6.1.15 vacisvapiyajåd¥nåµ kiti  
*op-ya-ta (other rules) 
 
In this derivation the augment must “wait” for the correct root form, which 
does not however present itself until after the affixation of yaK. 
 Patañjali recognises the problematic nature of the derivation of 
aupyata and resorts to a ßlokavårttika which recommends various 
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adjustments of Påˆini's grammar so as to make the v®ddhi-substitution of 
a-u possible.12 Interestingly, the Kåßikå under P. 6.4.72 offers a different 
solution, making use of Paribhå∑å 43 (counted as in Någeßa's 
Paribhå∑endußekhara: ßabdåntarasya pråpnuvan vidhir anityo 
bhavati). Patañjali knows and uses this Paribhå∑å, but not in the present 
context. It is however clear that both solutions for the derivation of 
aupyata — that of the Mahåbhå∑ya and that of the Kåßikå — try to 
propose a way in which the correct form will be obtained without 
lookahead. 
[21] 
§4.3 Consider next the derivations of åyan “they went” and åsan “they 
were”. Joshi & Kiparsky present these as demonstrating Påˆini's 
awareness of lookahead. This derivation passes through the following 
steps: 
 
i-la‹ 
i-anti 
i-an (up to this point, the desired augment å could be derived by 6.4.72 
å∂  ajåd¥nåm) 
y-an 6.4.81 iˆo yaˆ 
åyan 6.4.72 å∂  ajåd¥nåm (in virtue of 6.4.22 asiddhavad atrå bhåt) 
 
Joshi & Kiparsky explain: 
 
Before a consonant, 6.4.71 lu∫la∫l®∫k∑v a∂  udåtta˙ requires a 
short augment a-. The desired å could be derived prior to applying 
6.4.81, but “lookahead” precludes that. To get å-, both 6.4.81 and 
6.4.72 have been put into a section where all rules are asiddha[vat] 
with respect to each other (the å bhåt section 6.4.22 ff.). 
Accordingly we “pretend” that the root still begins with a vowel. 
There was no other reason for putting the rules into that section. 
This shows that Påˆini assumed ... lookahead ... . 
 
                                                
12 Mahå-bh III p. 208 l. 17 ff. (on P. 6.4.74). 
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The derivation of åsan is similar: 
 
as-la‹ 
as-anti 
as-an (up to this point, the desired augment å could be derived by 6.4.72 
å∂  ajåd¥nåm) 
s-an 6.4.111 ßnasor allopa˙ 
åsan 6.4.72 å∂  ajåd¥nåm (in virtue of 6.4.22 asiddhavad atrå bhåt) 
 
These two derivations are a few times referred to in the Mahåbhå∑ya.13 
Under P. 6.4.22 asiddhavad atrå bhåt Patañjali rejects the notion that 
one purpose of this sËtra is to allow the formation of åsan (as maintained 
by Joshi & Kiparsky, as we have seen). Quite on the contrary, according to 
Patañjali Påˆini's grammar contains an indication to show that prefixing å 
is stronger [22] than dropping a, and therefore takes place before the latter 
spoils the derivation. (Mahå-bh III p. 188 l. 9-10 (on P. 6.4.22 vt. 5): 
astilopas tåvan na prayojayati / åcåryaprav®ttir jñåpayati lopåd å∂ bal¥yån 
iti yad ayaµ ßnasanor allopa˙ [P. 6.4.111] iti taparakaraˆaµ karoti /)14 No 
lookahead is required if we accept Patañjali's solution. The same applies to 
the other ‘solutions’ which he offers in this context to account for åsan, 
åyan and other forms. In other words, Patañjali has found a way to avoid 
Joshi & Kiparsky's conclusion to the extent that the derivations of åyan 
and åsan show Påˆini's awareness of lookahead. 
 
§4.4 Patañjali is less successful in warding off lookahead under sËtra 
4.1.90 yËni luk. A problem arises in the derivation of phåˆ†åh®tå˙ 
‘students of the yuvan-descendent of Phåˆ†åh®ti’.15 Phåˆ†åh®ti is himself 
                                                
13 Mahå-bh I p. 143 l. 19 ff. (on P. 1.1.57); III p. 188 l. 5 ff. (on P. 6.4.22 vt. 5); 
III p. 209 l. 10 ff. (on P. 6.4.74 vt. 2). 
14 Cp. Geiger, 1909: 224. 
15 “[T]he word [yuvan] is given as a technical term in grammar in the sense of 
one, who is the son of the grandson or his descendant, provided his father is 
alive; the term is also applied to a nephew, brother, or a paternal relative of the 
grandson or his descendant, provided his elderly relative, if not his father, is 
alive; it is also applied to the grandson, in case respect is to be shown to him; cf. 
P. 4.1.163-167.” (Abhyankar & Shukla, 1977: 317 s.v. yuvan). 
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the (gotra-)descendent of Phåˆ†åh®ta,16 but this is less important in the 
present context. The yuvan-descendent of Phåˆ†åh®ti is also called 
Phåˆ†åh®ta, formed with the suffix Ôa by P. 4.1.150 
phåˆ†åh®timimatåbhyåµ ˆaphiñau. The students of this last 
Phåˆ†åh®ta are called phåˆ†åh®tå˙; this word is formed through the luk-
elision of Ôa (by P. 4.1.90 yËni luk), and the subsequent adding of aÔ 
(by P. iñaß ca). The derivation unites in this way the following elements: 
 
 phåˆ†åh®ti-(luk of Ôa)-aÔ 
 
The difficulty is that luk of Ôa takes place because a prågd¥vyat¥ya suffix 
beginning with a vowel follows (anuv®tti of aci in 4.1.90 from the 
preceding rule). But the specific suffix aÔ — which does begin with a 
vowel — is conditioned by the fact that it is added to a stem in iÑ, which 
is not the case until Ôa has been elided.17 How does Patañjali solve this 
problem? 
[23] 
 Patañjali proposes the following solution. The locative aci in P. 
4.1.90 yËni luk (aci) is not a locative which makes known that a suffix 
beginning with a vowel (ac) follows (it is not a parasaptam¥); it is rather a 
vi∑ayasaptam¥, which means something like ‘locative of scope’. When a 
suffix beginning with a vowel is the scope and luk-elision has been carried 
out, the suffix that obtains should be added. (Mahå-bh II p. 242 l. 21-23 
(on P. 4.1.90 vt. 2): ac¥ti nai∑å parasaptam¥ / kå tarhi / vi∑ayasaptam¥ / 
ajådau vi∑aya iti / tatråci vi∑aye luki k®te yo yata˙ pratyaya˙ pråpnoti sa 
tato bhavi∑yati /) 
 Patañjali does not clearly say what he means by all this. At first 
sight it would seem that here he does consider that later stages of the 
derivation have to be taken into account during an earlier one. In other 
                                                
16 “The word [gotra] is used by Påˆini in the technical sense of a descendant 
except the son or a daughter; cf. ... P. 4.1.162.” (Abhyankar & Shukla, 1977: 144 
s.v. gotra). 
17 Here we seem to be confronted with a case of circularity (or mutual 
dependence) which is not altogether dissimilar to what we found above in 
connection with the introduction of pratyåhåras. The consequences of this for the 
‘extended siddha-principle’ cannot here be explored. 
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words, it would seem that in this case Patañjali, perhaps under duress, 
accepts and uses lookahead.18 
 Before we draw this conclusion it will be wise to see how Patañjali 
uses the expression vi∑ayasaptam¥ elsewhere in his Mahåbhå∑ya. He does 
so on three other occasions. On one of those, the ‘locative of scope’ is the 
locative of the one word of P. 2.4.35 årdhadhåtuke. If this had been a 
parasaptam¥, there would be a difficulty in the derivation of bhavyam, 
which would become bhåvyam instead. The crucial step is the substitution 
of bhË for as by P. 2.4.52 in which årdhadhåtuke is still valid from P. 
2.4.35. This difficulty has been explained in detail by Joshi & Roodbergen 
(2000: 60-61), whom I quote here: 
 
[On the parasaptam¥ alternative], instead of bhavyam we would de-
rive bhåvyam as follows: 
 
A. (1) as-  + ÔyaT  P. 3.1.124 
 (2) bhË- + ya   P. 2.4.52 
 (3) bhau + ya   P. 7.2.115 
 (4) bhåv + ya   P. 6.1.79 
 (5) (bhåv + ya) + sU  P. 4.1.2 
[24] 
 (6) (bhåv + ya) + am  P. 7.1.24 
 (7) bhåv + yam   P. 6.1.107 
       bhåvyam. 
 
The point is that in this derivation the årdhadhåtuka suffix ÔyaT is 
added immediately in the first stage of the derivation. This is 
possible, because by P. 3.1.124 ÔyaT must be added after a verbal 
base ending in a consonant, in our case, the s of as-. 
 
On the other hand, the assumption that årdhadhåtuke is a 
vi∑ayasaptam¥ leads to the desired result, as follows: 
 
B. (1) as- 
 (2) bhË-    P. 2.4.52 
 (3) bhË + yaT   P. 3.1.97 
 (4) bho + ya   P. 7.3.84 
 (5) bhav + ya   P. 6.1.78 
                                                
18 This would agree with Joshi & Roodbergen, 1971: transl. p. 3 fn. 1: 
“Patañjali often raises the question whether a particular locative is vi∑ayasaptam¥ 
or parasaptam¥. The difference is that in the first case the grammatical operation 
is applied even if the environmental factor is not present in the first stage of the 
prakriyå, but is added only afterwards. ... So vi∑ayasaptam¥ means: first apply 
the rule, then add the environmental element, ...” Note that Patañjali uses the 
expression vi∑ayasaptam¥ only four times in his Mahåbhå∑ya. 
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 (6) (bhav + ya) + sU  P. 4.1.2 
 (7) (bhav + ya) + am  P. 7.1.24 
 (8) bhav + yam   P. 6.1.107 
       bhavyam. 
 
Here the point is that the verbal base substitution takes place before 
the årdhadhåtuka suffix is actually added. Now ÔyaT cannot be 
added in the second stage of the prakriyå, because bhË- does not 
end in a consonant. On the other hand, the suffix yaT is added by 
P. 3.1.97. This rule says that yaT is to be added after a verbal base 
ending in a vowel. 
 
In the then following pages Joshi & Roodbergen give a detailed analysis 
of the vårttikas and Bhå∑ya on P. 2.4.35. They conclude (p. 64): 
“Apparently, Kåtyåyana is convinced that årdhadhåtuke is a parasaptam¥. 
That is why he proposes to change the rule. The idea of vi∑ayasaptam¥ 
seems not to be known to Kåtyåyana, or at least not under that name. ... 
Patañjali, on the other hand, is acquainted with vi∑ayasaptam¥ ...” 
 Joshi & Roodbergen then explain in more detail what the 
vi∑ayasaptam¥ position is believed to accomplish in the Mahåbhå∑ya 
passage under consideration (p. 64-65): 
 
Let us return to the difficulty to remove which Kåtyåyana wants to 
rephrase the rule and Patañjali has recourse to [25] vi∑ayasaptam¥. 
The difficulty arises in the derivation of bhavya stated under ... A, 
above, which requires the substitution of bhË- for as-. By P. 1.1.56 
bhË- is considered sthånivat ‘like the original’, except when a 
grammatical operation is conditioned by a speech sound. The addi-
tion of the årdhadhåtuka suffixes ÔyaT and yaT is conditioned by a 
speech sound, namely, a consonant and a vowel occurring in final 
position of the verbal base respectively. Since in this respect bhË- 
is not sthånivat and since it ends in a vowel, we can only add yaT 
by P. 3.1.97. This gives us the desired form, namely, bhavya. But 
the difficulty starts with the parasaptam¥ interpretation of 
årdhadhåtuke. This requires the presence of an årdhadhåtuka suffix 
before as- can be replaced by bhË-. Since as- ends in a consonant, 
this suffix can only be ÔyaT, by P. 3.1.124. Consequently, we 
derive the form bhåvya, which is not the desired form. 
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 The vi∑ayasaptam¥ interpretation of årdhadhåtuke intends to 
remove this difficulty by taking into account the årdhadhåtuka suf-
fix required at a later stage in the derivation, namely, the suffix 
yaT. Thereby the introduction of a specifier årdhadhåtuka suffix in 
the first stage of the prakriyå is postponed. In other words, taking 
into account the change or changes required at a later stage, in our 
case, the ajanta quality of the verbal base, the vi∑ayasaptam¥ 
interpretation maintains that for the replacement of as- by bhË- the 
mere assumption of an årdhadhåtuka suffix is sufficient. Only later 
on, after the replacement of as- by bhË- has taken place, the 
årdhadhåtuka suffix is specified. 
 
Joshi & Roodbergen's formulation is somewhat confusing, because it con-
tains expressions suggesting lookahead (“taking into account the ård-
hadhåtuka suffix required at a later stage in the derivation, namely, the 
suffix yaT”) beside others that don't (“the vi∑ayasaptam¥ interpretation 
maintains that for the replacement of as- by bhË- the mere assumption of 
an årdhadhåtuka suffix is sufficient”). Patañjali's precise formulation does 
not allow us to decide with certainty whether he here accepts lookahead or 
not. (Mahå-bh I p. 484 l. 6-7 (on P. 2.4.35 vt. 5): asati paurvåparye 
vi∑ayasaptam¥ vijñåsyate / årdhadhåtukavi∑aya iti / tatrårdhadhåtukavi∑aye 
jagdhyådi∑u k®te∑u yo yata˙ pråpnoti pratyaya˙ sa tato bhavi∑yati /) It is 
however clear that an interpretation of his words is possible in which 
lookahead is not required: the mere assumption of an årdhadhåtuka suffix 
is [26] responsible for the substitution of bhË- for as-; the precise form of 
the årdhadhåtuka suffix is determined subsequently. 
 A similar reasoning can be applied to the third passage where 
Patañjali uses the expression vi∑ayasaptam¥. It here concerns the word 
årdhadhåtuke in P. 3.1.31 åyådaya årdhadhåtuke vå. (Mahå-bh II p. 
41 l. 17-19 (on P. 3.1.31 vt. 4): årdhadhåtuka iti nai∑å parasaptam¥ / kå 
tarhi / vi∑ayasaptam¥ / årdhadhåtukavi∑aya iti / tatrårdhådhåtukavi∑aya 
åyådiprak®ter åyådi∑u k®te∑u yo yata˙ pratyaya˙ pråpnoti sa tato bhavi∑yati 
/) 
 Perhaps Patañjali's most revealing use of the term vi∑ayasaptam¥ 
occurs under P. 3.1.26 hetumati ca. Here the question is raised whether 
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the locative hetumati qualifies the meaning of the suffix to be added (Ôic) 
or the meaning of the stem, i.e. the verbal root, to which it is to be added. 
The preliminary position is that, as a locative, it should qualify the 
meaning of the suffix; if it qualified the meaning of the stem, an ablative 
would have been required. (Mahå-bh II p. 31 l. 7-10 (on P. 3.1.26): katham 
idaµ vijñåyate / hetumaty abhidheye ˆij bhavat¥ti / åhosvid dhetumati yo 
dhåtur vartata iti / yuktaµ punar idaµ vicårayitum / nanv 
anenåsaµdigdhena pratyayårthaviße∑aˆena bhavitavyaµ yåvatå hetumat¥ty 
ucyate / yadi hi prak®tyarthaviße∑aˆaµ syåd dhetumata ity evaµ brËyåt /) 
Patañjali rejects this argument in the following words:19 
 
naitad asti / bhavant¥ha hi vi∑ayasaptamyo 'pi / tad yathå / pramåˆe 
yat pråtipadikaµ vartate striyåµ yat pråtipadikaµ vartata iti / evam 
ihåpi hetumaty abhidheye ˆij bhavati hetumati yo dhåtur vartata iti 
jåyate vicåraˆå / 
“This is not the case. For here (in this grammar) vi∑ayasaptam¥s, 
too, are [used]. For example, [one can say:] ‘a nominal stem that 
expresses measure (pramåˆe)’; ‘a nominal stem that denotes a wo-
man (striyåm)’. In the same way also here (in this grammar) [one 
can say:] ‘when the meaning hetumat is to be expressed, there is 
[the suffix] Ôic’, ‘a verbal root that is expressive of [the meaning] 
hetumat’. This is why a doubt arises.” 
 
In this passage Patañjali uses the expression vi∑ayasaptam¥ in order to 
refer to meaning conditions expressed by the locative. But if this is what 
the expression means here, its meaning in the three remaining cases where 
it is used cannot be very different. 
[27] 
 On two occasions the Mahåbhå∑ya paraphrases a sËtra word in the 
locative by adding vi∑aye. The word saµjñåyåm in P. 5.2.23 is 
paraphrased as saµjñåyåµ vi∑aye (Mahå-bh II p. 375 l. 4). In view of the 
preceding passage this may be understood to mean “when a saµjñå is to 
                                                
19 Mahå-bh II p. 31 l. 10-12 (on P. 3.1.26). 
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be expressed”, or more generally “when it concerns a saµjñå”.20 However, 
there is a subtle difference between the locative hetumati in P. 3.1.26 and 
saµjñåyåm in P. 5.2.23 and many other sËtras. The meaning hetumat 
belongs to the verbal root to which a suffix will be added; Patañjali 
specifies this quite cleary, saying: hetumati yo dhåtur vartate. The term 
saµjñåyåm, on the other hand, does not apply to the stem, but to the result 
of combining stem with suffix. This is the reason why Patañjali makes a 
general statement about the way saµjñåyåm in sËtras is to be 
understood:21 “In the [rules] which are prescribed saµjñåyåm, [this term] 
is not understood as saµjñåyåm abhidheyåyåm ‘when a saµjñå is to be 
expressed’, but rather as follows: ‘if by [the stem] ending in the suffix a 
saµjñå is understood’.” In spite of initial appearances to the contrary, this 
passage does say that saµjñåyåm means “when a saµjñå is to be 
expressed” (but not by the stem alone, of course), and this is clearly 
presented as equivalent to saµjñåyåµ vi∑aye.22 The paraphrase chandasi 
vi∑aye (Mahå-bh II p. 64 l. 19) for the word chandasi understood in P. 
3.1.85 (from 84) clearly means: “when it concerns Vedic usage”. 
 Elsewhere in his Mahåbhå∑ya Patañjali speaks of the three kinds of 
location (adhikaraˆa), which is what is primarily expressed by the 
locative. Location, he states there, can be covering (vyåpaka), touching 
(aupaßle∑ika), or vai∑ayika (Mahå-bh III p. 51 l. 8-9: adhikaraˆaµ nåma 
triprakåraµ vyåpakam aupaßle∑ikaµ vai∑ayikam iti). The term vai∑ayika is 
derived from vi∑aya. The third kind of location therefore concerns the 
vi∑aya, the scope. It is however interesting to note that Patañjali, in 
presenting these three kinds of location, evidently talks about the non-
technical use of the locative. Patañjali's use of the expression [28] 
vi∑ayasaptam¥, too, may therefore refer to a non-technical use of the 
locative. Such a non-technical use of the locative — which can often be 
                                                
20 I propose no translation for the difficult term saµjñå, but refer to the doctoral 
thesis of my student Maria-Piera Candotti (2006) for a detailed discussion. 
21 Mahå-bh II p. 68 l. 2-4 (on P. 3.1.112 vt. 3): athavå ya ete saµjñåyåµ 
vidh¥yante te∑u naivaµ vijñåyate saµjñåyåm abhidheyåyåm iti / kiµ tarhi / 
pratyayåntena cet saµjñå gamyata iti /. 
22 Candotti (see note 20, above) draws attention to a passage in the Kåßikå on P. 
5.1.62 which shows that this much later commentary clearly distinguishes 
between abhidheyasaptam¥ and vi∑ayasaptam¥: abhidheyasaptamy e∑å, na 
vi∑ayasaptam¥. 
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translated in English with the help of some such term as ‘concerning’ — is 
indeed well-known and frequently used in Sanskrit. 
 In view of these considerations, we may conclude that the word 
årdhadhåtuke in sËtras 2.4.35 and 3.1.31, being a vi∑ayasaptam¥, means, in 
Patañjali's opinion, something like “when it concerns an årdhadhåtuka 
[suffix]”. A meaning condition, too, can be expressed with the help of a 
vi∑ayasaptam¥, because here, too, that particular non-technical use of the 
locative is involved. If our analysis of Patañjali's understanding of the term 
vi∑ayasaptam¥ is correct, this term is not used to indicate that this or that 
grammatical element will appear later on in the derivation. Patañjali rather 
falls back on this ordinary use of the locative where the technical 
grammatical interpretation of this case (the parasaptam¥) confronts him 
with insuperable difficulties. This technical grammatical use of the 
locative confronts him with insuperable difficulties in certain cases, 
precisely because he insists that the following element has to be there at 
the moment the next step is taken. For those who accept that lookahead is 
an essential part of Påˆini's grammar, no such requirement can be made. 
 It is open to question whether Patañjali's trick to return to the ordi-
nary use of the locative solves his problems. More recent grammarians in 
the Påˆinian tradition treat the vi∑ayasaptam¥ itself as something like a 
technical term, which is used when lookahead seems unavoidable to them. 
It is difficult to state with confidence what Patañjali may have thought 
about these for him difficult cases. It is however certain that he does not 
explicitly admit that lookahead is needed, even here. He suggests that the 
ordinary use of the locative, rather than its technical grammatical use, will 
do the job. We have seen that it doesn't.23 
 
§4.5 In four passages Patañjali introduces the notion of ‘future designa-
tion’ (bhåvin¥ saµjñå) in order to deal with difficulties similar to the ones 
                                                
23 J. A. F. Roodbergen (1991, esp. p. 310 ff.) argues that sårvadhåtuke in P. 
1.3.67 may have been meant as a vi∑ayasaptam¥ by Påˆini. Perhaps one should 
say that Patañjali does not use this expression in this context because he had 
more successfully succeeded in forcing the cases covered by this sËtra into his 
preferred scheme of derivations. 
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which he resolves with the help of a [29] vi∑ayasaptam¥. All these 
passages contain the following comparison:24 
 
tad yathå / kaßcit kaµcit tantuvåyam åha / asya sËtrasya ßå†akaµ 
vayeti / sa paßyati yadi ßå†ako na våtavyo 'tha våtavyo na ßå†aka˙ 
ßå†ako våtavyaß ceti viprati∑iddham / bhåvin¥ khalv asya 
saµjñåbhipretå sa manye våtavyo yasminn ute ßå†aka ity etad 
bhavat¥ti /.  
Take an example: Someone says to some weaver: “weave a cloth 
out of this thread”. He (i.e., the weaver) thinks: if it is (already) a 
cloth, it is not (still) to be woven. But if it is (still) to be woven, it 
is not a cloth. (To say,) it is (still) to be woven and it is a cloth 
becomes contradictory. Certainly, what he means is a designation 
(viz., ‘cloth’) yet to come (bhåvin¥ saµjñå). That, I think, is to be 
woven, which, when woven, becomes the (thing called) cloth.25 
 
This example is meant to illustrate Patañjali's position according to which 
it is common, and therefore justified, to use a designation before it 
becomes applicable. This is supposed to avoid difficulties, as in the 
following case.26 
 The Mahåbhå∑ya discusses under P. 2.1.51 the possibility of 
formulating a rule of the form dvigusaµjñå pratyayottarapadayo˙ “The 
designation dvigu is conditioned by the presence of a (taddhita-) suffix or 
of a final member”. Both a vårttika and Patañjali's commentary agree that 
this might result in mutual dependence: the addition of the taddhita-suffix 
or of the final member is conditioned by the designation dvigu, and the 
designation dvigu is conditioned by the taddhita-suffix of the final 
                                                
24 Mahå-bh I p. 112 l. 10-13 (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3); I p. 275 l. 6-8 (on P. 1.3.12 vt. 
2); I p. 394 l. 13-16 (on P. 2.1.51 vt. 4); II p. 113 l. 18-21 (on P. 3.2.102 vt. 2). 
Tr. Joshi & Roodbergen, 1971: 35-36. 
25 Statements like this (“weave a cloth”, “make a pot”, etc.) occupied the minds 
of practically all philosophers of the early centuries of the common era, and led 
them to adopt various ontological and other positions, such as satkåryavåda, 
ßËnyavåda, ajåtivåda, anekåntavåda, etc. (see Bronkhorst, 1999). The fact that 
Patañjali is clearly untouched by the presupposition (the ‘correspondence 
principle’) that underlies all those philosophical discussions pleads for an early 
date of Patañjali, before this shared presupposition managed to take hold of all 
thinkers: Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jaina (and including Bhart®hari). 
26 See Joshi & Roodbergen, 1971: 22 ff. for details. 
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member.27 A subsequent vårttika (no. 4) claims that the problem [30] has 
been resolved, but does not tell us how. Patañjali makes some suggestions, 
among them the one in which the comparison with the weaver plays a 
central role. It states that the designation dvigu is formed, “when that 
follows to which [later on], when it has resulted, the designations pratyaya 
‘suffix’ and uttarapada ‘final member’ apply”. (Mahå-bh I p. 394 l. 17-18 
(on P. 2.1.51 vt. 4): evam ihåpi tasmin dvigur bhavati yasyåbhinirv®ttasya 
pratyaya uttarapadam iti caite saµjñe bhavi∑yata˙.) 
 Kaiya†a, followed by Joshi & Roodbergen, explains that the 
Bhå∑ya means to say that the form pratyayottarapadayo˙ is a 
vi∑ayasaptam¥. This is however open to question. Patañjali's formulation 
clearly indicates that the suffix or final member are in place at the time 
when the designation dvigu is formed. Only the designation pratyaya or 
uttarapada will be applied later. The example of the weaver presumably 
shows that no lookahead is required for this postponed designating. 
 One may wonder whether the solution of a ‘future designation’ is 
very convincing in this case. Patañjali himself may not have thought so, 
for he immediately turns to another solution of the problems surrounding 
P. 2.1.51, in which Påˆini's own formulation (with taddhitårtha-) is then 
shown to be acceptable. The ‘future designation’ plays a role in the middle 
of the debate, but appears to be ultimately abandoned. 
 Something similar can be said about two of the remaining three 
passages that invoke the comparison with the weaver (on P. 1.1.45 vt. 3 
and on P. 1.3.12 vt. 2). 
 The last passage that makes use of the expression bhåvin¥ saµjñå 
occurs under P. 3.2.102.28 Here, too, there is a problem of mutual depen-
dence: the technical term ni∑†hå must apply to the suffixes Kta and 
KtavatU that are already there (by P. 1.1.26 ktaktavatË ni∑†hå), and these 
same two suffixes are brought into existence by the technical term ni∑†hå 
(by P. 3.2.102 ni∑†hå [bhËte]). (Mahå-bh II p. 113 l. 3-4: sato˙ 
ktaktavatvo˙ saµjñayå bhavitavyaµ saµjñayå ca ktaktavatË bhåvyete tad 
etad itaretaråßrayaµ bhavati.) Patañjali proposes as solution to look upon 
                                                
27 Once again we are confronted with the question whether perhaps Påˆini was 
not disturbed by this kind of circularity; cp. § 3.1 and note 17 above. 
28 Cp. Scharfe, 1961: 89-90. 
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the term ni∑†hå as a “future designation” (bhåvin¥ saµjñå): “Those two 
[suffixes] are used to express the past which, after having come into 
existence, will [later on] obtain the technical designation ni∑†hå.” (Mahå-
bh II p. 113 l. 21-22: tau bhËte kåle bhavato yayor abhinirv®ttayor ni∑†hety 
e∑å saµjñå bhavi∑yati.) Here, as elsewhere, one may wonder whether this 
circularity would have disturbed Påˆini, or indeed whether this is really a 
case of [31] circularity.29 It is however clear that Patañjali was disturbed 
by this presumed case of circularity, and that he was determined to get rid 
of it, by hook or by crook. 
 
 
§5.  At this point we must consider the passages where Patañjali 
appears to opt for influence of the form to be derived on the shape of the 
derivation to be chosen. I am referring to the passages where he interprets 
the word para in P. 1.4.2 viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam to mean i∑†a 
‘desired’. In other words, at a stage of a derivation where two rules are in 
conflict, the operation that is desired must be carried out. The situation has 
been presented by Franz Kielhorn in the following manner (1887: 129): 
 
In 1.4.2 Påˆini prescribes that of two conflicting rules the subse-
quent (para) rule, in the order of the A∑†ådhyåy¥, shall take effect in 
preference to the preceding rule. Now Kåtyåyana on various occa-
sions shows that Påˆini's rule is not universally true, and he points 
out a number of pËrva-viprati∑edhas, i.e. instances in which the 
preceding rule must take effect in preference to the subsequent 
rule. According to Patañjali, on the other hand, the special rules 
given by Kåtyåyana are unnecessary, and the objections of that 
grammarian only show that he has not fully understood the word 
para in P. 1.4.2. Para, amongst other things, also means ‘desired’ 
(i∑†a), and what Påˆini really teaches is, that of two conflicting 
rules it is the desired rule that should take effect ... 
 
                                                
29 See Scharfe, 1961: 90. 
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What is a desired rule? Kielhorn proposes the following explanation: “i.e. 
that rule, whatever be its position in the A∑†ådhyåy¥, the application of 
which will lead to correct words”. He then adds his comments: “Here ..., 
then, we ought to possess a perfect knowledge of the language, if we 
would rightly apply the rules of Påˆini's grammar.”30 
 It is to be noted that Kielhorn's comments go well beyond that 
which Patañjali explicitly states. According to Patañjali, in a number of 
situations the desired rule should take effect. He does not say by whom 
that rule is desired. Kielhorn concludes that it is the rule desired by the 
grammarian who desires to arrive at correct forms, but that is neither 
stated nor even suggested by Patañjali. It [32] is much more in keeping 
with Patañjali's general approach to understand these remarks differently. 
The desired rule is the rule desired by Påˆini. How do we know which is 
the rule desired by Påˆini? From tradition. And how do we know which is 
the traditional position with regard to these specific derivations? By asking 
Patañjali. 
 I do not need to remind you that Patañjali is never shy to impose 
the view which he considers traditional to solve otherwise irresolvable 
problems. This is most clearly the case where he cites the phrase 
vyåkhyånato viße∑apratipattir  na hi saµdehåd alak∑aˆam. This 
is Paribhå∑å 1 in a number of treatises on Paribhå∑ås, including Någeßa's 
Paribhå∑endußekhara; but it is first of all a Paribhå∑å which Patañjali 
frequently cites in his Mahåbhå∑ya. It means, in Kielhorn's translation 
(1874: 2): “The precise (meaning of an ambiguous term) is ascertained 
from interpretation, for (a rule), even though it contain an ambiguous term, 
must nevertheless teach (something definite).” The ‘interpretation’ in 
Kielhorn's rendering, which translates the Sanskrit vyåkhyåna, is the 
traditional explanation, not just any explanation which a reader might feel 
like applying.31 
                                                
30 Similarly Cardona, 1970: 61. 
31 Patañjali explains his understanding of the word vyåkhyåna in the following 
passage (Mahå-bh I p. 11 l. 20-23; on Paspaßåhnika vt. 11): na hi sËtrata eva 
ßabdån pratipadyante / kiµ tarhi / vyåkhyånataß ca / nanu ca tad eva sËtraµ 
vig®h¥taµ vyåkhyånaµ bhavati / na kevalåni carcåpadåni vyåkhyånaµ v®ddhi˙ 
åt aij iti / kiµ tarhi / udåharaˆaµ pratyudåharaˆaµ våkyådhyåhåra ity etat 
samuditaµ vyåkhyånaµ bhavati / “... the words are not just known from sËtra 
‘the rules’. Then how (do we know them)? From vyåkhyåna ‘explanation’ also. 
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 Readers of Någeßa's Paribhå∑endußekhara will remember that the 
Jñåpaka of the Paribhå∑å vyåkhyånato viße∑apratipattir  na hi 
saµdehåd alak∑aˆam is the double use of the marker Ô in the 
Måheßvara sËtras. Without explanation this double use can only give rise 
to confusion, because the precise meaning of the pratyåhåras aÔ and iÔ 
will be ambiguous. Påˆini — according to Patañjali — has introduced this 
ambiguity in order to make clear to the users of the grammar that in case 
of doubt they depend on the traditional explanation. In this particular case 
they are informed that the pratyåhåra iÔ is to be understood with the 
second marker [33] Ô, whereas aÔ must be understood with the first 
marker Ô except in the case of sËtra 1.1.69 aˆudit savarˆasya 
cåpratyaya˙. For our purposes it is important to note that Patañjali does 
not reconstruct, on the basis of the desired outcome, what aÔ and iÔ 
should mean. Quite on the contrary, he authoritatively provides the 
traditional interpretation of these two expressions, an interpretation which, 
as he suggests, comes directly from Påˆini. In other words, the desired 
outcome of a derivation does not determine for Patañjali how a rule should 
be understood, neither here nor anywhere else. 
 Let us now return to Patañjali's proposed interpretation of para in 
P. 1.4.2 viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam. In certain cases, he maintains, 
para means i∑†a ‘desired’. In view of Patañjali's general approach toward 
derivations, this cannot but mean that the choice of one rule at the expense 
of another that applies at the same time is desired by Påˆini, and has 
nothing to do with the readers judgement as to what is the correct 
outcome.32 When, therefore, Kielhorn states that that rule is desired, 
whatever be its position in the A∑†ådhyåy¥, the application of which will 
lead to correct words, he expresses a truism. But when he adds that we 
ought to possess a perfect knowledge of the language, if we would rightly 
                                                                                                         
But isn't it true that this very sËtra ‘(body of) rules’, when divided up (into its 
constituent words) becomes the vyåkhyåna ‘explanation’? The mere (separate) 
words resulting from carcå ‘(the process of) repeating (the words of a given 
text)’, as v®ddhi, åt, aic do not constitute vyåkhyåna ‘explanation’. Then (in) 
what (does vyåkhyåna consist)? (In) udåharaˆa ‘example’, pratyudåharaˆa 
‘counterexample’, (and) våkyådhyåhåra ‘completion of the utterance (by 
supplying words)’. All of that taken together becomes the vyåkhyåna 
‘explanation’.” (tr. Joshi & Roodbergen, 1986: 161-163. 
32 Cardona (1976: 191) understands Patañjali in the same way as Kielhorn, but 
disagrees with the former. 
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apply the rules of Påˆini's grammar, he is mistaken. We do not need to 
know the correct outcome of a derivation in order to correctly apply the 
rules of Påˆini's grammar. Quite on the contrary, we arrive at the correct 
outcome if we strictly follow his rules, along with the traditional 
explanation that comes along with them. This traditional explanation 
contains information as to which rules will have preference in specific 
situations. 
 
 Let us now consider a few passages where Patañjali uses the device 
of interpreting para in the sense of i∑†a ‘desired’. 
 
§5.1 A whole series of examples occurs under P. 7.1.95-96 vt. 10. We 
will consider two of these. 
(i) The correct derivation of jatune, dative singular of the neuter word 
jatu ‘lac’, is essentially as follows: 
 
jatu-‹e  4.1.2 svaujas° 
jatu-nUM-e  7.1.73 iko 'ci vibhaktau 
jatune 
[34] 
The problem is that at the first stage another rule — 7.3.111 gher ∫iti  — 
is applicable, which would substitute the guˆa vowel o for u of jatu. What 
is worse, 7.3.111 being para with regard to 7.1.73, it should have priority 
over the latter. To avoid this, P. 7.1.95-96 vt. 10 
(guˆav®ddhyauttvat®jvadbhåvebhyo num pËrvaviprati∑iddham) states that 
in this particular case the earlier rule has precedence. Patañjali is not of the 
opinion that such a special statement is necessary, for para here means 
i∑†a.33 
(ii) A similar problem arises in the formation of atisakh¥ni. Here the 
correct derivation 
 
                                                
33 Mahå-bh III p. 275 l. 24 – p. 276 l. 5: tatra guˆasyåvakåßa˙ / agnaye våyave / 
numo ‘vakåßa˙ / trapuˆ¥ jatun¥ / ihobhayaµ pråpnoti / trapuˆe jatune // … // sa 
tarhi pËrvaprati∑edho vaktavya˙ / na vaktavya˙ / i∑†avåc¥ paraßabda˙ / 
viprati∑edhe paraµ yad i∑†aµ tad bhavat¥ti // 
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atisakhi-Jas 4.1.2 svaujas° 
atisakhi-Íi 7.1.20 jaßßaso˙ ßi˙ (and 1.1.42 ßi 
sarvanåmasthånam) 
atisakhi-nUM-i 7.1.72 napuµsakasya jhalaca˙ 
atisakh¥-n-i 6.4.8 sarvanåmasthåne cåsaµbuddhau 
 
is jeopardised by sËtras 7.1.92 sakhyur asaµbuddhau and 7.2.115 aco 
ñˆiti , which would substitute v®ddhi (= ai) for final i of atisakhi, instead 
of the addition of nUM. Once again the earlier rule has precedence 
according to Patañjali because para means i∑†a.34 
 The same vårttika covers a number of further cases, all of which 
can be explained, Patañjali maintains, by understanding the word para in 
the sense i∑†a. Patañjali cites this vårttika in advance under P. 1.4.2 
viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam, and proclaims there already his view that 
in these cases the word para expresses the meaning i∑†a (Mahå-bh I p. 306 
l. 1-10; on P. 1.4.2. vt. 7). 
 
§5.2 Another example is the following. In the derivation of vav®te from 
the root v®t a dilemma presents itself. The relevant part of the derivation 
has the following shape: 
 
v®t - lIÈ 3.2.115 parok∑e li†  
v®t-v®t-lIÈ 6.1.8 li†i  dhåtor anabhyåsasya 
v®-v®t-lIÈ 7.4.60 halådi˙ ße∑a˙ 
[35] 
va-v®t-lIÈ 7.4.66 ur at 
va-v®t-ta 3.4.78 tiptasjhi. . .  
va-v®t-eÍ 3.4.81 li†as tajhayor eßirec 
 
At this point two rules apply. P. 1.2.5 asaµyogål li†  kit stipulates that 
the substitute for lIÈ, i.e. eÍ, has the marker K, which prevents substitution 
of guˆa or v®ddhi in v®t by P. 1.1.5 k∫iti  ca. On the other hand there is 
                                                
34 Mahå-bh III p. 275 l. 26 – p. 276 l. 1: v®ddher avakåßa˙ / sakhåyau sakhåya˙ / 
numa˙ sa eva (i.e., trapuˆ¥ jatun¥, JB) / ihobhayaµ pråpnoti / atisakh¥ni 
bråhmaˆakulån¥ti // … etc. 
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7.3.86 pugantalaghËpadhasya ca, which prescribes substitution of 
guˆa for the vowel of v®t. Patañjali on P. 1.2.5 points out that 1.2.5 is no 
exception (apavåda) to 7.3.86. The two rules therefore apply 
simultaneously, and contradict each other. If one applies in this situation 
P. 1.4.2 viprati∑edhe paraµ kåryam, one would have to prefer 7.3.86 
pugantalaghËpadhasya ca which occurs later in the A∑†ådhyåy¥ and 
arrive at an incorrect form *vavarte. In this situation Patañjali states that 
para means i∑†a ‘desired’. The desired rule in the situation is 1.2.5 
asaµyogål li†  kit, which leads to the correct form vav®te. (Mahå-bh I p. 
194 l. 14-16, on P. 1.2.5 vt. 2: ihobhayaµ pråpnoti / vav®te vav®dhe / 
paratvåd guˆa˙ pråpnoti // idaµ tarhy uktam i∑†avåc¥ paraßabdo 
viprati∑edhe paraµ yad i∑†aµ tad bhavat¥ti /.) 
 
§5.3 It is not necessary to consider all the passages where Patañjali uses 
this specific device. Sometimes it occurs in the middle of a debate in 
which it only plays a provisional role.35 The main conclusion to be drawn 
is that Patañjali never explicitly states that we, the users of the grammar, 
are free to give precedence to the sËtra which we prefer. The ‘desired’ rule 
which has to be used in an ambiguous situation is the rule desired by 
Påˆini, or perhaps one should say: by the tradition. This means that neither 
we nor indeed anyone else need to know which is the correct form to be 
attained at the end of the derivation. We simply must use, at each junction, 
the rule which is to be preferred, either because of some principle 
underlying Påˆini's grammar, or because we know that that is the rule 
‘desired’ by Påˆini. The outcome will automatically be correct, and we do 
not need to worry about it. 
 
 
§6.  Patañjali does not always admit that the issue of linearity is open 
and can give rise to major complications. At times he proceeds as if the is-
sue is resolved and a particular order is [36] presupposed. An example is 
his mention of the forms prad¥vya and pras¥vya in his discussion of P. 
                                                
35 The remaining passages are: Mahå-bh I p. 46 l. 14; p. 404 l. 26; II p. 237 l. 
16; p. 279 l. 3-4; p. 337 l. 20; III p. 18 l. 1; p. 99 l. 12; p. 134 l. 16-17; p. 201 l. 
5; p. 238 l. 10. 
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1.1.56 sthånivad ådeßo 'nalvidhau. The correct derivation of these 
two forms, Patañjali claims, depends on the correct interpretation of that 
sËtra.36 The correct derivation of pras¥vya is as follows:37 
 
pra-siv-Ktvå  3.4.21 samånakart®kayo˙ pËrvakåle 
pra-siv-LyaP  7.1.37 samåse 'nañpËrve ktvo lyap 
pra-s¥v-ya  8.2.77 hali ca 
pras¥vya 
 
Patañjali's concern is that sthånivadbhåva might treat the substitute LyaP 
like its substituend Ktvå, so that iÈ might then be prefixed to it by 7.2.35 
årdhadhåtukasye† valåde˙. The sËtra prescribes prefixing of iÈ to an 
årdhadhåtuka suffix beginning with val, i.e. with any consonant except y. 
The interpretation Patañjali proposes for P. 1.1.56 is meant to avoid this 
difficulty. 
 Patañjali does not mention that the same difficulty might pop up at 
an earlier stage. Consider the following incorrect derivation: 
 
pra-siv-Ktvå 
pra-siv-iÈ-Ktvå 7.2.35 årdhadhåtukasye† valåde˙ 
pra-siv-iÈ-LyaP 7.1.37 samåse 'nañpËrve ktvo lyap 
 
This would give rise to incorrect *prasiviya. By not mentioning this possi-
bility, Patañjali avoids the issue. 
 
Patañjali is equally taciturn in the case of the derivation of words like 
yu∑mat, the ablative plural of yu∑mad. Here the correct derivation is:38 
 
yu∑mad-bhyas  4.1.2 svaujas° 
yu∑mad-at  7.1.31 pañcamyå at 
yu∑ma-at  7.2.90 ße∑e lopa˙ 
yu∑mat 
                                                
36 Mahå-bh I p. 133 l. 13 f. (on P. 1.1.56). 
37 See Joshi & Roodbergen, 1990: transl. p. 22 n. 89. 
38 Cf. Joshi & Roodbergen, 1990: transl. p. 29. 
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In this derivation there is no place for P. 7.2.86 yu∑madasmador 
anådeße, which prescribes substitution of long å for final d of [37] 
yu∑mad before an ending beginning with a consonant, except when the 
ending itself is a substitute. This accounts for forms like loc. pl. yu∑måsu. 
However, at the first stage yu∑mad-bhyas there is an ending that begins 
with a consonant, viz. bhyas. How can P. 7.2.86 be prevented to apply 
here? Patañjali does not say a word about it. 
 The expression anådeße in 7.2.86 yu∑madasmador anådeße 
needs to retain our attention somewhat longer. It would seem to imply that 
from Påˆini's point of view substitution of a suffix has to precede any ope-
rations on the preceding stem.39 That is to say, Patañjali might have used 
the presence of this expression anådeße to argue that sËtra 7.2.86 cannot 
apply at the first stage yu∑mad-bhyas. Surprisingly, he does not do so. As 
a matter of fact, when commenting on this sËtra he states in so many 
words that the expression anådeße is superfluous. (Mahå-bh III p. 304 l. 
17-18 (on P. 7.2.89): anådeßagrahaˆaµ ßakyam akartum / katham / hal¥ty 
anuvartate na cånådeßo halådir asti // tad etad anådeßagrahaˆaµ ti∑†hatu 
tåvat såµnyåsikam //. )40 Elsewhere he tentatively suggests that this same 
expression makes known to us that substitutes are like their substituends. 
(Mahå-bh I p. 134 l. 2-4 (on P. 1.1.56 vt. 1): evaµ tarhy åcåryaprav®ttir 
jñåpayati sthånivad ådeßo bhavat¥ti yad ayaµ yu∑madasmador anådeße (= 
P. 7.2.86) ity ådeßaprati∑edhaµ ßåsti.) 
 
 
§7.  It is clear from the above that Patañjali tries both to avoid looking 
back and looking ahead in explaining grammatical derivations. He does 
so, because he is determined to fit them into the straight jacket of linearity 
as he conceives of it. How do we explain that Patañjali avoids looking 
back and looking ahead even in situations where this forces him to 
consider sometimes highly complex (and often implausible) alternatives? 
                                                
39 Alternatively, it might be understood as a confirmation of the importance of 
lookahead, as maintained by Joshi & Kiparsky. 
40 Renou, Term. gramm. p. 334 s.v. såmnyåsika explains: “« conforme à la 
teneur originelle » du sË[tra] ... (dit d'un élément qui est à conserver, encore 
qu'on ne puisse le justifier).” 
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In order to get more clarity, let us try to characterise his method in broader 
terms. 
 The derivations as conceived of in the Mahåbhå∑ya ideally consist 
of a number of distinct stages in each of which an operation takes place 
that is exclusively determined by the elements at that moment in place. 
Earlier stages are not taken into consideration, and future elements play no 
role, so that the way a derivation will develop beyond the present stage has 
no effect on decisions to be [38] taken at present. That is to say, 
derivations are “pushed from the back”, they are never “pulled forward”. 
What is more, they are only pushed by the immediately preceding 
elements. We can conceive of these derivations as being causal processes 
which pass through distinct stages, each of which is determined by 
preceding factors that act blindly, without regard for the consequences. 
 It is understandable that Patañjali's understanding of grammatical 
derivations may have contributed to what Jan E. M. Houben (2003: 158 
ff.) calls a myth in modern Påˆinian studies, the myth of Påˆini's grammar 
as a powerful, purely formal system. Houben cites various authors who 
emphasise the mechanistic aspect of the grammar, and the as yet unfruitful 
attempts that have been made to associate Påˆini with the computer. A 
step by step derivation, in which each step completely determines what the 
next step will be like, no doubt resembles a mechanical process that might 
be carried out by a machine without the need of a human being to steer it. 
It is however to be kept in mind that this resemblance concerns Patañjali's 
understanding of Påˆini's grammar, an understanding which — as we have 
seen — is to at least some extent forced upon it (and which, one may be 
tempted to add, does not always fit). The question whether grammatical 
derivations as conceived of by Påˆini are equally conducive to a 
comparison with a computerised derivation remains open and may indeed 
be less obvious. Since the emphasis in this study is on the Mahåbhå∑ya's 
understanding of the A∑†ådhyåy¥, no more will be said about the details of 
how Påˆini himself wanted his grammar to be understood. 
 It is probable that the oral tradition of grammatical derivation had 
been interrupted during the time between Påˆini and his earliest 
commentators. There are clear indications that point in that direction, such 
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as the loss of accents from Påˆini's text at the time of Patañjali,41 the loss 
of the correct interpretation of the expressions for optionality,42 and the 
failure to correctly interpret the term asiddha.43 However, as far as the 
strict linearity imposed by the Mahåbhå∑ya is concerned, without looking 
back or looking ahead, this hypothesis does not explain enough. The 
reason is that this text presents sometimes highly complex explanations for 
derivations which are at first sight totally transparent. Beside or perhaps 
instead of such an interruption of the tradition we may have to consider the 
possibility that one or [39] more other factors played a role, factors which 
led to a complete change of outlook about the nature of a grammatical 
derivation. 
 
 
§8.  More than fifteen years ago I had the privilege and pleasure of 
delivering the third series of the “Pandit Shripad Shastri Deodhar 
Memorial Lectures”, here at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 
dealing with some issues pertaining to the Mahåbhå∑ya.44 In the third 
lecture (“The Mahåbhå∑ya and the development of Indian philosophy”) I 
had occasion to draw attention to the close parallelism which exists 
between certain ideas expressed in the Mahåbhå∑ya and ideas developed 
within the Abhidharma of the school of Buddhism called Sarvåstivåda or 
by its predecessors. (In order to avoid repeating clumsy formulations, I 
will use the expressions Sarvåstivåda to refer both to the school properly 
so called and to its possible predecessors whose names remain unknown to 
us.) I could point out that there are good reasons to think that certain 
linguistic ideas which we find in the Mahåbhå∑ya are heavily indebted to 
that school of thought. Patañjali's notions of words and sounds in 
particular appear to be reflections of the dharmas called vyañjanakåya and 
padakåya respectively by the Sarvåstivådins.  
                                                
41 Thieme, 1935: 120 ff. 
42 Kiparsky, 1979. 
43 Bronkhorst, 1980; 1989. 
44 These lectures were delivered March 4-6, 1987, and published in that same 
year as Three Problems pertaining to the Mahåbhå∑ya (Post-graduate and 
Research Department Series No. 30). 
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 Since that time I have been able to collect further evidence which 
confirms that Patañjali was acquainted with this school of thought. This 
further evidence concerns the use of certain expressions and acquaintance 
with a philosophical position that agrees with that of the Sarvåstivådins. 
Since I have published this additional material elsewhere,45 I will only 
briefly recall the main points here. The Mahåbhå∑ya cites the following 
proverb: åmrån p®∑†a˙ kovidårån åca∑†e “Being questioned about mangoes 
he acquaints [one] with the kovidåra (trees)”. A very similar proverb is 
known from Buddhist literature. Patañjali speaks at one occasion about 
“sciences which have something auspicious in the beginning, in the middle 
and in the end” (ma∫galåd¥ni ma∫galamadhyåni ma∫galåntåni ßåstråˆi). 
He does so in connection with Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥, but it is clear that this 
characterisation does not fit very well. However, a number of Buddhist 
texts speak of the Dharma taught by the Buddha as being “auspicious in 
the beginning, in the middle and in the end” (ådau [40] kalyåˆa, madhye 
kalyåˆa, paryavasåne kalyåˆa and similar terms in Påli). Thirdly, a story 
told in the Buddhist canon about a certain ascetic who presumably did not 
hear the sound of a group of carts passing by, is told in the Mahåbhå∑ya 
about Íåka†åyana. Patañjali also shows acquaintance with the 
philosophical position according to which a material object is a collection 
of qualities; he does not accept it, but we know that the Sarvåstivådins did. 
 This is not the occasion to evaluate all these different points in de-
tail. As said before, I have tried to do so in some earlier publications. 
Today I wish to draw your attention to a feature of Sarvåstivåda thought 
which may help us understand the changes in grammar which I have 
documented in what precedes. 
 The Sarvåstivåda school of thought (or perhaps a preceding school 
of thought which subsequently exerted a profound influence on the Sarvå-
stivådins) underwent an intellectual revolution at some unknown date 
during the centuries preceding the Common Era. The outcome of this 
revolution was that it came to accept a thoroughly atomistic way of 
looking at the world. According to this way of looking at the world only 
momentary dharmas exist. The word dharma is used, within Buddhism, in 
                                                
45 See Bronkhorst, 1995; 2002. 
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a rather special sense: it came to denote here the ultimate, and only, 
constituents of all that exists. Momentary dharmas succeed each other, and 
this succession of dharmas is governed by rules of causality, which draw 
their inspiration from the old Buddhist doctrine of origination in 
dependence (prat¥tyasamutpåda). That is to say, preceding dharmas 
condition subsequent dharmas.46 This picture of reality has particular 
validity for mental processes, most of the dharmas being mental by nature, 
but not only there. All processes are conceived of as series of momentary 
stages which are conditioned by the immediately preceding one, and never 
by succeeding ones (nor by the anticipation of succeeding ones). 
 It is important to emphasise this last feature of causality as concei-
ved of, first by the Sarvåstivåda Buddhists or their predecessors, and sub-
sequently by other Buddhists. It confronted Buddhist thinkers with a num-
ber of difficulties, which they took great pains to solve. If only the im-
mediately preceding stage of a causal sequence determines the 
immediately following one, certain causal sequences become difficult to 
understand. There should in that case be no gaps in the sequences of 
dharmas, because there would be no way to bridge those gaps. However, 
according to Buddhist thinking, certain meditative states interrupt by their 
very nature the mental processes into which they are inserted. Some of 
[41] these states imply the suppression of all mental activity and of 
consciousness itself; the term frequently used is nirodha. When a 
meditator arises out of such a state, the first moment of renewed 
consciousness does not succeed any immediately preceding mental 
dharma. Given the way the Sarvåstivådins and their intellectual successors 
conceived of causal processes, mental states such as nirodha should not be 
able to exist. 
 But causality conceived of in this manner has no place for 
teleology either. A causal sequence conceived in this manner cannot be 
guided by any future goal. This made it very difficult for these Buddhist 
thinkers to account for karmic retribution. Karmic retribution is, of course, 
a causal process, but not a blind one. It “aims at” retribution, and is 
therefore presumably guided by the intended outcome of the process. This, 
                                                
46 See, e.g., Bronkhorst, 2000: 106 ff. 
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however, should be excluded by the very way in which causal processes 
were conceived of. 
 Buddhist thinkers took these difficulties very seriously, and came 
up with various solutions. The Sarvåstivåda Buddhists made the claim 
which is responsible for their name, viz., that past dharmas exist beside 
present and future dharmas, so that a past dharma can exert a direct 
influence on future dharmas. Most other Buddhists did not accept this 
counter-intuitive position. The Sautråntikas, for example, proposed 
another solution: series of seeds (b¥ja) connect the deed with its effect. In 
the case of the meditational state of nirodha, the last moment before the 
suppression of consciousness is connected through this series with the first 
conscious moment after it. Again other Buddhists, particularly the 
Yogåcåras, introduced the notion of ålayavijñåna, one of whose functions 
was, once again, to account for the gaps in continuity in the causal chains 
of dharmas.47 It is not possible at present to deal with all these solutions in 
detail. They do show, however, how seriously the Buddhists took their 
vision of causal chains in which each following element is exclusively 
determined by the immediately preceding one. 
 If we now return to the Mahåbhå∑ya, it will be clear that this vision 
of the nature of a causal chain shares some important features with the 
interpretation of Påˆini's grammar which we find in this grammatical text. 
Here, too, we find processes in which each stage is determined by the 
immediately preceding one, not by earlier stages, nor indeed by stages that 
are still to come. I take it that the close similarity between the ways in 
which the early [42] Påˆin¥yas and Sarvåstivådins conceived of processes 
is not due to coincidence. It seems indeed most likely that one of the two 
borrowed from the other. If borrowing took place, there can be no doubt as 
to its direction. The new way of conceptualising processes was for the 
Sarvåstivådins the result of rationalising various obscure early teachings 
ascribed to the Buddha, most notably the origination in dependence 
(prat¥tyasamutpåda). In the Påˆinian school of grammar, on the other 
hand, this new way of thinking about processes was at the basis of a 
                                                
47 Schmithausen, 1987; further Bronkhorst, 2000a: ch. 10 and 11; 2000: 108 f., 
120 f. 
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complete break in the tradition, as we have seen. Clearly the new way of 
thinking was a foreign intrusion into grammatical thought. 
 I have elsewhere drawn attention to the extent of the influence of 
Sarvåstivåda thinking on other currents of thought in ancient India.48 
Essential features spread, not only to other schools of Buddhism, but also 
to currents of thought that were not Buddhist. Particularly striking is the 
influence that Sarvåstivåda thinking exerted on the Vaiße∑ika system of 
philosophy and on Jaina thought already in canonical times. It is not 
possible, nor indeed necessary, to treat this issue once again here. It is 
however important to remember that there are reasons to think that the 
atomistic vision that characterized Sarvåstivåda thinking became for some 
time a fundamental presupposition about the nature of the world (I have 
used the expression episteme) for all those engaged in serious reflection. 
Patañjali was therefore not alone in undergoing the influence of this 
Buddhist school. 
 
 
§9.  It will be clear from what precedes that there are good reasons for 
considering the following. The Mahåbhå∑ya contains a number of indica-
tions which suggest acquaintance with Buddhist literature and thought. 
Most interesting for us at present is that the Mahåbhå∑ya appears to have 
undergone the influence of Sarvåstivåda thought. The new thinking 
developed in this Buddhist school about the nature of causal processes was 
influential enough to thoroughly affect the way grammatical derivations 
were thought of in the Påˆinian tradition. 
 The evidence I have presented in this study, along with the 
evidence published elsewhere which I have referred to, proves that this 
hypothesis deserves serious attention. Important work has been done in the 
past few decades to show that Påˆini's grammar was not in all respects 
meant to be interpreted in the way it is interpreted in the Mahåbhå∑ya. But 
nobody seems to have [43] addressed the question why exactly this all-
important commentary imposes a different interpretation — this 
                                                
48 See Bronkhorst, 2006. 
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interpretation — on the A∑†ådhyåy¥. The hypothesis which I present here 
is able to answer this question. 
 Does this hypothesis agree — and if yes: to what extent — with 
other types of information which we have about the period concerned? 
And which period exactly are we talking about? 
 The date of the Mahåbhå∑ya has been frequently discussed.49 This 
text contains some statements that refer to Greek invasions far into the 
Indian heartland. These allow us to conclude, with a fair amount of 
confidence, that Patañjali was alive at the time of these invasions; his 
Mahåbhå∑ya may therefore have been composed sometime after the year 
150 B.C.E. I am aware that some scholars have reservations with regard to 
this date.50 They usually refer to the objection formulated by La Vallée 
Poussin (1930: 202) and repeated by Frauwallner (1960: 300-303). Both 
these scholars are disturbed by the mention of the Íakas along with the 
Greeks (ßakayavanam) in a passage which mentions people living outside 
the Óryåvarta “the domain of the åryas”.51 However, the Íakas were there 
at the time, if perhaps mainly behind the Greeks seen from the point of 
view of the Gangetic plain. They constituted a threat for the Greek 
kingdoms in the north-west to which these latter were soon to succumb.52 
It seems far from improbable that Patañjali was aware of their presence. It 
is all the more probable in view of the fact that there are good reasons for 
thinking that Patañjali belonged to the north-west of the Indian 
subcontinent, to a place from where he would have to travel through 
Såketa (Ayodhya) in order to reach På†aliputra.53 
 With regard to Buddhism in the north-west, our present state of 
knowledge is reliably summed up by Richard Salomon in his recent book 
Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhåra (1999: 5): 
 
                                                
49 See Cardona, 1976: 263 ff. 
50 The most recent example known to me is Pollock, 2003: 84. 
51 Mahå-bh I p. 475 l. 4 (on P. 2.4.10). 
52 Cp. Kulke and Rothermund, 1998: 71: “this [Bactrian] Greek kingdom finally 
succumbed to the Shakas, a Central Asian tribe, between 141 and 128 BC.” 
53 Cardona, 1976: 269 f. 
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It is generally assumed (though this remains to be confirmed histo-
rically and archeologically) that Buddhism was first introduced to 
Gandhåra around the middle of the [44] third century B.C. under 
the sponsorship of Aßoka, the great emperor of the Mauryan 
dynasty and patron of Buddhism, whose control of the region is 
attested by the sets of his rock edicts engraved in Kharo∑†h¥ script 
at Shåhbåga®h¥ and Månsehrå. A second testimony to an early 
presence of Buddhism in the northwestern edge of the Indian 
subcontinent is the famous “Questions of Milinda”, which purports 
to record a philosophical dialogue between King Menander, the 
greatest of the Indo-Greek rulers in the second century B.C., and a 
Buddhist monk named Någasena. Although the presumed 
Gåndhår¥ original of this text is lost, it survives in various Pali and 
Chinese versions and stands as the earliest explicit testimony of the 
encounter of Buddhism with the cosmopolitan cultures of 
Gandhåra — an encounter which, in later centuries, is vividly and 
abundantly illustrated in Gandhåran sculpture with its unique 
combination of Indian and Hellenistic or Roman themes and styles. 
 But other than these two sources, we have little direct evi-
dence for this early phase of Gandhåran Buddhism, for it is not 
until the first century B.C. that we begin to find abundant physical 
remains, in the form of stËpas and other structural remains, figural 
and narrative sculpture, and, especially, Buddhist ritual and dedica-
tory inscriptions. From this point on we can begin to trace the his-
tory of Gandhåran Buddhism in relative detail, as Buddhist institu-
tions grew, flourished, and expanded under the patronage of the 
successive “foreign” dynasties. By the first two centuries of the 
Christian era Gandhåra had become one of the major centers of 
Buddhism in India, and it was apparently at some point during this 
period that Buddhism began to make its way beyond the borders of 
its Indian homeland and establish footholds in parts of Iran and 
China. 
 There is compelling evidence that Gandhåran monks in 
particular were instrumental in the early expansion of Buddhism 
beyond India. For example, two Buddhist inscriptions in the Kha-
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ro∑†h¥ script and the Gåndhår¥ language, which must have been 
written by monks from Gandhåra, have been found near the cities 
of Lo-yang and Chang-an, which were major early centers of Bud-
dhism in China. Furthermore, the abhidharma literature of the 
influential Sarvåstivåda school, which for the most part survives 
only in Chinese translations, frequently refers [45] to a Gandhåran 
tradition, and it is generally agreed by modern scholars that some 
of the important abhidharma treatises extant in Chinese 
translations, such as the Abhidharma-h®daya, were originally 
composed in Gandhåra. 
 
This long citation teaches us that Gandhåra became a major centre of 
Buddhism, and of Sarvåstivåda Buddhism in particular. It is true that the 
archaeological and inscriptional evidence for the period we are interested 
in — the second century B.C.E., perhaps already earlier — leaves to be 
desired.54 It is yet very likely that there were Buddhists in that region at 
that time. It is equally likely that Patañjali the grammarian was acquainted 
with the form of Buddhism current in that region. Influence of north-
western Buddhism on the Mahåbhå∑ya, which explains so many 
peculiarities of this text, can therefore be accepted as highly probable. 
 
 
§10. What about the vårttikas in the Mahåbhå∑ya attributed to 
Kåtyåyana?55 
 It may have struck you in the preceding pages that neither 
Kåtyåyana nor his vårttikas played any role in most discussions. This is 
due to the fact that the problems we were dealing with were in large 
majority Patañjali's problems. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether 
perhaps only Patañjali underwent the claimed Sarvåstivåda influence; if 
that turns out to be correct, Kåtyåyana may then be assumed to have lived 
                                                
54 Behrendt, 2004: 41 n. 8, which refers to Errington's article “Numismatic 
evidence for dating the Buddhist remains of Gandhara”, proposes a founding 
date no earlier than the late 2nd century B.C.E. for the Dharmaråjikå complex in 
Taxila. 
55 On Kåtyåyana see the appendix at the end of this study. 
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too early, or too far away, to undergo any such influence. A closer 
inspection of Kåtyåyana's point of view is clearly called for. 
 In order to see as clearly as possible in these matters, we have to 
distinguish two approaches toward Påˆini's grammar, both of which may 
translate into a demand for linearity: (i) avoidance of mutual dependence 
in the interpretation of rules, and (ii) imposition of linearity of a specific 
kind on derivations. I have so far mainly argued that Patañjali was 
concerned with the second of these two, imposition of a specially 
restrictive kind of linearity on derivations; at the same time there can also 
be no doubt that Patañjali [46] experienced mutual dependence in the 
interpretation of rules as a shortcoming.56 Kåtyåyana is to be associated 
with the first approach, avoidance of mutual dependence in the 
interpretation of rules. The question is: Do we find in his vårttikas 
evidence that he, too, tried to impose this special kind of linearity on 
derivations? 
 In the interpretation of P. 1.3.3 hal antyam, studied above, there 
can be no doubt that there is a risk of mutual dependence: in order to 
understand this sËtra we have to know it already; we have to know that the 
final consonant of hal is an anubandha, but the only Påˆinian way to find 
this out is with the help of this selfsame sËtra. Kåtyåyana finds this mutual 
dependence unacceptable, and tries to find a way around it. Mutual 
dependence is also present in the difficulties surrounding the sËtras 1.1.10 
nåjjhalau and 1.1.69 aˆudit savarˆasya cåpratyaya˙. These 
difficulties arise when we interpret 1.1.69 in the light of 1.1.10 (as we 
should) and 1.1.10 in the light of 1.1.69. The solution, according to 
Kåtyåyana and Patañjali, lies in a linear ordering of these rules. In these 
two cases there is however no question of imposing linearity on a 
derivation. 
 In all the passages we studied which did concern the imposition of 
linearity on a derivation, on the other hand, Kåtyåyana's vårttikas play no 
role. Indeed, the expressions which betray Patañjali's concern with this 
issue — bhËtapËrvagati, vi∑ayasaptam¥ and bhåvin¥ saµjñå — do not even 
                                                
56 Cp. the following sentence, which occurs numerous times in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya: itaretaråßrayåˆi ca (kåryåˆi) na prakalpante. 
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occur in the vårttikas.57 The impression I have so far derived from this 
study is therefore that in this specific respect, Patañjali and Kåtyåyana 
represent two different approaches: Patañjali imposes to the extent 
possible a strict form of linearity on grammatical derivations, where only 
the immediately preceding step is allowed to provide the information for 
the next operation; what happened earlier in the derivation or what will 
happen later is not supposed to play a role. In Kåtyåyana's vårttikas we 
find a rejection of mutual dependence, and therefore a tendency to order 
the rules of Påˆini linearly, but not, as far as I can see, the demand that a 
derivation has to be linear in the strict sense demanded by Patañjali. I do 
not exclude that further study may oblige us to modify this position, but 
for the time being I see no reason to abandon this observation.58 
 
[47] 
§11. The analysis which I have submitted to you in this study suggests 
that a development took place from Påˆini to Patañjali in which linearity 
came to play an increasingly important role. Kåtyåyana was not happy 
with the mutual dependence which characterises some of Påˆini's rules, 
and proposed ways to read these rules in a linear sequence so as to avoid 
this mutual dependence. Patañjali shared this dislike for mutual 
dependence of rules, but introduced another form of linearity as well. For 
him a grammatical derivation has to consist of a number of independent 
stages which fully determine which operation will apply next. Patañjali's 
linear model for derivations coincides in its essential aspects with the way 
systematised Sarvåstivåda — followed by other Buddhists — visualised 
causal processes. This suggests that Patañjali, but perhaps not Kåtyåyana, 
underwent the influence of this Buddhist school of thought. Chronological 
and geographic considerations lend plausibility to this position. 
                                                
57 The expression itaretaråßraya(tva) occurs numerous times in vårttikas. The 
term bhËtapËrva occurs twice (P. 1.1.29 vt. 1 and 2), both time in connection 
with the formation of a compound containing that expression.  
58 Paranjpe (1922) does not deal with this issue. 
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[48] 
APPENDIX: KÓTYÓYANA 
 
Scholars nowadays agree that the vårttikas, though included in the 
Mahåbhå∑ya, have not been composed by its author. The most widely held 
view is that they, or most of them, have an author whose name is 
Kåtyåyana. However, grammarians have not always thought like this. 
Bhart®hari and his contemporaries made the division into portions of sepa-
rate authorship quite differently from the way which has nowadays 
become customary. In a study which I dedicated to this issue in 1990 I 
reached the following conclusion:59 
 
[T]he division of the Mahåbhå∑ya which came to be generally ac-
cepted was not taken for granted by Bhart®hari. Where we see in 
the short sentences which are commented upon in the Bhå∑ya (the 
‘Vårttikas’) the work of one author (or perhaps several of them), in 
the Bhå∑ya the work of another, Bhart®hari’s idea on this matter 
was different. He too distinguished between at least two authors, 
but he drew the boundaries differently. We may not be able to say 
regarding each portion of the Mahåbhå∑ya to which author Bhar-
t®hari ascribed it. It seems however clear that in his opinion many 
Bhå∑ya portions and many, or most, vårttikas belonged together 
and had one single author. These parts of the Mahåbhå∑ya were 
called ‘Vårttika’ by Bhart®hari. 
 
Subsequent authors in the grammatical tradition came to attribute most of 
the vårttikas to Kåtyåyana. This attribution is clearly in place in Kaiya†a's 
commentary on the Mahåbhå∑ya, which often characterises lines from that 
text as being a vårttika. Kaiya†a also distinguishes between the three munis 
of Sanskrit grammar, and lays down the well-know maxim yathottaraµ 
munitrayasya pråmåˆyam “the later the Muni, the greater his authority”.60 
Kielhorn (1876) has argued for the separate authorship of those vårttikas, 
                                                
59 Bronkhorst, 1990: 139. 
60 Kielhorn, 1876: 53 n. *, referring to Kaiya†a on P. 1.1.29 (I p. 293). 
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and drawn attention to the one passage in the Mahåbhå∑ya where the name 
Kåtyåyana is mentioned in connection with a vårttika. It was also Kielhorn 
(1876) who formulated a criterion for distinguishing vårttikas from 
Patañjali's text, and who applied this criterion systematically in his edition 
of the Mahåbhå∑ya. Kielhorn argued for the single authorship, by 
Kåtyåyana, for most of the vårttikas. This position has been [49] 
strengthened in subsequent years. Indeed, there are reasons to think that 
the vårttikas together constitute a single work that has been preserved in 
its entirety. Scharfe (1977: 135) presents the following arguments: 
 
We have reason to believe that no vårttika has been left out: in the 
sometimes lengthy discussions ... we see a logical development of 
the argument. When Kåtyåyana refers about a hundred times to 
another vårttika with uktam “It has been said” this reference can be 
found ...; all eight adhyåya-s conclude with the auspicious word 
siddham “it is correct”. 
 
On following pages Scharfe reviews the information we have about the 
date and region of Kåtyåyana. About the former he states (p. 138): 
 
To determine when ... Kåtyåyana lived we depend on incidental 
references. On Påˆini VI 3 21 ∑a∑†hyå åkroße “[Before the second 
word of a compound there is non-disappearance of] the genitive 
ending if [the compound] expresses an insult” Kåtyåyana's vårttika 
3 demands an exception — devånåµpriya, the title of the Maurya 
kings. The elliptical expression ßåka-pårthiva ‘vegetable [eating] 
king,’ i.e. ‘vegetarian king’ in vårttika 8 on Påˆini II 1 69, can 
hardly refer to anybody but Priyadarßin Aßoka and suggests thus a 
date after 250 B.C. On the other hand, Kåtyåyana cannot have 
lived much later than that because of the large derived literature 
(variant readings of the vårttika-s, polemics against them, etc.) 
quoted by Patañjali (c. 150 B.C.) in his Mahåbhå∑ya. 
 
It will be clear that these arguments primarily provide a date after which 
Kåtyåyana must have lived. While there can be no doubt that he must have 
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composed his vårttikas before Patañjali, the distance in time which 
separates him from the author of the Mahåbhå∑ya can hardly be specified 
on the basis of the fact that variant readings of vårttikas and polemics 
against them were known to Patañjali. If we imagine that Patañjali lived in 
an intellectually active age, many opinions may have found expression 
within a short or even very short span of time. It is moreover open to 
question to what extent Patañjali drew upon a “derived literature” 
(whether oral or written); opinions may have been known to him that had 
not been crystallised into texts. A [50] further point to be noted is that the 
Mauryas were not soon forgotten. Patañjali mentions them in a passage in 
which he provided information about some of their activities.61 
 Regarding Kåtyåyana's region the evidence is confusing. Scharfe 
observes (p. 139): 
 
Scholars have long assumed that Kåtyåyana lived in the South, i.e. 
the Dekkhan, because of a statement of Patañjali. At the end of his 
very first vårttika Kåtyåyana offers a parallel: yathå laukika-
vaidike∑u “... as in secular and Vedic [affairs].” On the question 
why Kåtyåyana did not simply say: yathå loke vede ca “... as in the 
world[ly life] and in the Veda,” Patañjali suggests a) that 
Southerners are overly fond of secondary suffixes or b) that 
perhaps there is a special meaning to the longer formulation. 
Patañjali's suggestion has been taken by modern scholars as a 
statement that Kåtyåyana was a Southerner but no such statement 
is implied; all we may conclude is that Patañjali thought it possible 
that Kåtyåyana was a Southerner and that this may explain the 
unusual formulation. 
 
Scharfe does not deny that Kåtyåyana may have been a southerner — 
indeed, he provides some arguments that may support this idea —, he 
merely states here that Patañjali's suggestion does not prove it. Scharfe 
does not raise the question what exactly Patañjali may have meant by the 
expression southerner (dåk∑iˆåtya). The expression dåk∑iˆåtya — which, 
                                                
61 Falk, 1994: 325 ff. 
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if Vishva Bandhu's Vedic Word Concordance (VWC) is to be believed, is 
unknown to Vedic literature — is derived from the indeclinable dak∑iˆå by 
P. 4.2.98 dak∑ iˆåpaßcåtpurasas tyak. The indeclinable dak∑iˆå is 
formed by P. 5.3.36 dak∑ iˆåd åc, in the interpretation of which the word 
adËre from the preceding rule 35 (which will be cancelled by dËre in rule 
37) has to be taken into consideration. Dak∑iˆå therefore means “nearby 
towards the south”, and dåk∑iˆåtya “someone who lives nearby towards 
the south”. It is hard to believe that Patañjali, whose acquaintance with 
Påˆini's grammar cannot be doubted, used the word in any other meaning 
than this. We must conclude that there can hardly be any question of 
situating Kåtyåyana in the Dekkhan. Since we do not know where exactly 
Patañjali lived (he may have lived as far north as Kashmir, as maintained 
by Yudhi∑†hira M¥måµsaka, saµ 2030: I: 335), Kåtyåyana may have lived 
almost anywhere in north-western India if we are to be [51] guided by 
Patañjali's expression dåk∑iˆåtya. Unlike Scharfe, I tend to think that if 
Patañjali thought it likely that Kåtyåyana was from the near south, we 
have good reasons to accept that he was indeed from the near south. 
 Scharfe further draws attention to the fact that Kåtyåyana allows 
negated verb forms in Sanskrit (such as apacasi, akaro∑i) and points out 
that negated verb forms are strange to Sanskrit and the Indo-European 
languages in general, but are a common feature of the Dravidian 
languages. This makes it likely, he thinks, that Kåtyåyana did indeed live 
in the south. However, taken by itself this feature has little probative force. 
I therefore now turn to Scharfe's most definite statement: 
 
One thing is certain: Kåtyåyana neither belongs to the West nor to 
the North of India because of his links with the White Yajurveda 
which was not represented in these areas; nor was he an Easterner 
because in his vårttika 8 on Påˆini VII 3 45, he postulates the bird 
name vartaka ‘quail’ for the ‘eastern’ dialect while he apparently 
used vartika — as does the Våjasaneyi Saµhitå XXIV 30. 
 
If Kåtyåyana did not belong to the west, nor to the north or the east of 
India, one may be tempted to conclude that he belonged to the south. All 
these exclusions are based on one single argument: Kåtyåyana's presumed 
FROM PÓÔINI TO PATAÑJALI 58 
 
 
links with the White Yajurveda. In support of this link Scharfe refers to a 
short article by B. A. van Nooten  called “The grammarian Kåtyåyana and 
the White Yajurveda school” (1968). But van Nooten cites with approval 
Thieme's observation to the extent that the Våjasaneyi Saµhitå, i.e. the 
Saµhitå of the White Yajurveda, belongs to an eastern part of India. 
 A closer inspection of the evidence does not confirm Scharfe's 
conclusions. van Nooten's evidence for a link between Kåtyåyana and the 
White Yajurveda is far from compelling. It is based on a Vedic quotation 
in the Mahåbhå∑ya which van Nooten assumes could have originated with 
Kåtyåyana. The link with Kåtyåyana is clearly no more than hypothetical. 
But the link with the White Yajurveda is no less hypothetical. The Vedic 
quotation concerned cannot be found in Vedic literature, and the 
resemblance with passages in the Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa postulated by van 
Nooten is not close. The closest resemblance is with a line in the 
Kåtyåyana ÍrautasËtra, but even here there are important differences. As a 
whole, the White Yajurveda receives little attention in the Mahåbhå∑ya 
(which includes, of course, [52] Kåtyåyana's vårttikas); this is Wilhelm 
Rau's conclusion at the end of an exhaustive study and identification of all 
Vedic quotations in that text.62 
 There is however another factor which might be considered to 
plead in favour of a link between Kåtyåyana and the White Yajurveda. A 
vårttika on P. 4.3.105 puråˆaprokte∑u bråhmaˆakalpe∑u shows that 
Kåtyåyana was acquainted with what Patañjali calls yåjñavalkåni 
bråhmaˆåni; it also appears that he considered these statements as having 
been uttered more or less at the same time as Påˆini's A∑†ådhyåy¥. It seems 
likely that these yåjñavalkåni bråhmaˆåni have to be identified with 
statements attributed to Yåjñavalkya that have been preserved in 
B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad 3-4, and therefore in a part of the Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa, the Bråhmaˆa of the White Yajurveda.63 [53] This part of the 
                                                
62 Rau, 1985: 103: “Dem Weissen Yajurveda wird verhältnismässig geringe 
Beachtung zuteil.” 
63 Horsch, 1966: 391 ff. Slaje (forthcoming), referring to earlier authors, argues 
that the word bråhmaˆa here refers to single formulations rather than to whole 
texts. In support of this he cites a passage from Renou (1948: 75 [885]) which he 
seems to have misunderstood. Renou does indeed say that in his opinion the 
expression yåjñavalkåni bråhmaˆåni is not likely to refer to the Yåjñavalkya-
kåˆ∂a of the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad (3-4), this because it concerns “‘les traités 
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Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa is associated with the more eastern region of northern 
India: The court of king Janaka, closely linked to the Upani∑adic 
Yåjñavalka, was situated in Videha. Kåtyåyana's acquaintance with these 
relatively new texts support the idea that he may have had special links 
with the White Yajurveda, or with that region of the subcontinent. 
 Scharfe accepts the position — first formulated by Max Müller 
(1860: 138) and Theodor Goldstücker (1861/1965: 204 ff.), and 
subsequently defended by Paul Thieme (1935: 96 ff.; 1937; 1958: 41 (749) 
ff.) and taken over by Louis Renou (1938: 173 ff.) — according to which 
Kåtyåyana the Vårttikakåra and Kåtyåyana the author of the Våjasaneyi 
Pråtißåkhya of the White Yajurveda are one and the same person. This, if 
                                                                                                         
de Bråhmaˆa et de Kalpa’, non des chapitres d'Upani∑ad”. According to Renou, 
the expression refers to “sinon le Bråhmaˆa entier, du moins les portions non-
ßåˆ∂ilya”. That is to say, Renou does not here understand the word bråhmaˆa to 
mean ‘direct authoritative instruction’, ‘instructional formulation’. 
 It may here be useful to cite from an article by Harry Falk (1988: 226): 
“[D]as Wort upani∑ad im Sinne von ‘(oral fixiertem) Text über ein letztes, 
bewirkendes Prinzip’ [ist] sehr jung ... . Upani∑aden als Textgattung werden 
auch schon deshalb nicht namentlich zu erwarten sein, weil jeder Brahmane, der 
eine oder zwei davon auswendig lernen durfte, diese dem Begriff veda, genauer 
noch dem Begriff bråhmaˆa zugeordnet hätte. Denn, wie das PratijñåsËtra (1,2) 
der Våjasaneyins sagt: mantrabråhmaˆayor vedanåmadheyam, das heisst, man 
versteht unter veda die alten Verse und ein dazugehöriges Bråhmaˆa.” 
 Referring to an article by Michael Witzel that has not yet appeared in 
print, Slaje also argues that Kåtyåyana cannot refer to the Yåjñavalkya-kåˆ∂a of 
the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad, because the redaction of this Upani∑ad took place 
after Kåtyåyana (cp. Witzel, 1987a: 399 n. 76: “The final compilation of [the 
Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa], made up of several independent portions, is probably a 
comparatively late one; yet the compiler was able still to put cross-references 
into the Vedic text: ... : the compiler still knew Vedic well enough to produce ... 
sentences referring forwards and backwards in the text. On the other hand: the 
compiler was different from the (much later) redactor who seems to have lived 
many generations after Yåjñavalkya, even according to the various Vaµßas 
found in [the Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa] and [the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad]. I suspect 
that he was a contemporary of the Kåˆva dynasty of the Såtavåhana dynasty. ... . 
It is only the redactor that was responsible for glorification of Yåjñavalkya and 
for his authorship of the White [Yajurveda]; note that this information is added 
as the very last words of [the Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa] ...; note that the redactor 
already describes Janaka as presenting land to Yåjñavalkya ... . Yet even the 
Satakarˆi inscription, 2nd cent. A.D., ... still mentions only presents of cows 
given as dak∑iˆå to Brahmins, and not a donation of land ... .”). However, given 
the fact that the final redaction presupposes an existing text, little can be 
concluded from the fact that the final redaction of the Upani∑ad had not yet 
taken place at a certain time. 
 Some pages later Slaje states: “there is a direct line from Yåjñavalkya 
Våjasaneya , the probable redactor and most prominent figure of the corpus of 
White Yajurveda texts including the [B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad], to some key-
figures in the early M¥måµså as were Jaimini and Kåtyåyana. So it will not 
really come as a surprise that the Våjasaneyin  Kåtyåyana expressly referred to 
formulations (bråhmaˆas) of Yåjñavalkya ...” (Slaje's emphasis). Must we 
conclude that the redaction of the B®hadåraˆyaka Upani∑ad had after all been 
completed before Kåtyåyana? 
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true, might confirm the former's links with the White Yajurveda. I am not 
sure, however, whether and to what extent we can derive certain 
knowledge about Kåtyåyana's whereabouts from this fact, if it is one. 
 We know more nowadays about the regional links of the White 
Yajurveda than at the time Scharfe wrote the above passage. Since the 
Våjasaneyi Saµhitå may have been extracted from the Íatapatha 
Bråhmaˆa, we can concentrate on the latter. While books 1-5 of the 
Íatapatha Bråhmaˆa (Mådhyandina) are acquainted with more eastern 
regions, books 6-10 had their origin in a north-western location. Books 11-
14 frequently mention not only eastern areas (Kosala, Videha) but also 
more western ones; the final collection and edition of this text portion was 
made in the east.64 Subsequently the Mådhyandina school may have 
moved from the Prayåga-Kåß¥ area towards the west, and have reached 
Gujarat at an early point of time, in any case before 650 C.E. Since [54] 
the middle ages the Våjasaneyas have occupied all of northern India.65 
 Taking into consideration all these points, it will be clear that the 
question of Kåtyåyana's region remains complex. On the one hand he lived 
near Patañjali's region but more to the south. On the other there are some 
reasons to think that he may have had special links with the White 
Yajurveda, whose centre was situated more towards the east. No certain 
conclusion seems possible. 
 
                                                
64 Witzel, 1987: 197 ff.; cp. Mylius, 1965; 1972. 
65 Witzel, 1987: 201; 1985. 
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